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ABSTRACT: Scholars critical of the constitutionalization of American politics
use the history of struggles over reproductive health to illuminate the costs of
constitutional discourse. This Article reconsiders the costs of constitutional
discourse from the inside out, unearthing the history of how members of the
pro-choice movement debated, revised, criticized, and ultimately embraced
what many activists consciously saw as a limiting constitutional framework.
Studying activists' own debates about rights-claiming offers a new
dimension to studies of the dominance and costs of constitutional discourse. On
the one hand, the materials gathered here demonstrate the flexibility and
capaciousness of rights arguments. Contrary to what some commentators have
asserted, the history of the struggle for reproductive health strengthens rather
than weakens the case for the fluidity and adaptability of constitutional rhetoric.
On the other hand, although many shared an awareness of the drawbacks of
constitutional language, movement leaders sometimes marginalized those who
challenged a rights-centered approach. Constitutional discourse attracted
movement members independently of the influence of lawyers or litigators.
Indeed, many movement leaders committed more to the language of rights at a
time when activists had lost faith in the courts. The history of the movement
suggests that the pull of constitutional discourse may be greater-and less
tethered to the courts-than some studies have made plain.
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INTRODUCTION
Scholars critical of the constitutionalization of American politics use the
history of struggles over reproductive health to illuminate the costs of
"cast[ing] political views and values in the framework of constitutional
argument."' Diagnoses of the problems with constitutional culture are far-
ranging. Some suggest that when the courts transform an issue into a matter of
constitutional law, ordinary people feel disenfranchised and contribute less
2often to debate on a substantive legal or political issue. Others question
whether constitutional reasoning can capture the full range of demands for
social change that movements make: when activists adopt the rhetoric of a
court decision, they may be constrained in demanding certain forms of social
*3justice.
1. Robin West, Constitutional Culture or Ordinary Politics: A Reply to Reva Siegel, 94 CALIF. L.
REV. 1465, 1466 (2006).
2. Some scholars favor "weak judicial review" as an alternative to judicial supremacy, allowing
more room for popular engagement and influence. See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE
THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 249-53 (2004); Mark Tushnet, The
Relation Between Political Constitutionalism and Weak-Form Judicial Review, 14 GERMAN L.J. 2249,
2249-50 (2013); Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346,
1354 (2006) (stating that the target of his objection is strong-form, not weak-form, judicial
review). Other commentators view social-movement dialogue as a mediating influence on courts
otherwise indifferent to popular views. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social
Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the defacto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323
(2006) (presenting a classic study of the power of social movement activity to produce and to alter
regnant constitutional interpretations).
3. For studies questioning the value of constitutional discourse, see, for example, Louts MICHAEL
SEIDMAN, ON CONSTITUTIONAL DISOBEDIENCE 5 (2012), asking Americans to consider why they
should not "systematically ignore the Constitution"; Frank 1. Michelman, Why Not Just Say No? An
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For many scholars, the history of reproductive rights offers a particularly
potent example of what can go wrong when a Court treats a question as a
matter of constitutional rights. Pointing to Roe v. Wade, commentators suggest
that when a court defines a broad constitutional right, a judicial decision
triggers a backlash that sets back the cause a court embraces.4 Looking at
abortion and a variety of other case studies, other scholars highlight how
winning a constitutional right can convince social movement members to play
up arguments related to that victory, downplaying other core demands for
change or alternative, potentially effective arguments.5  Still other
commentators emphasize that rights claims focus grassroots activists on the
interests of individuals rather than those of the larger community, convincing
movements to set aside strategies that aid entire communities rather than their
individual members.6
The scholarly literature tells a cautionary tale about social movements
intent on winning or preserving constitutional rights. Such a victory can prove
to be hollow or worse, intensifying opposition to a cause. By focusing on
constitutional rights, movements may also marginalize the radical members
who imbue a cause with the energy and the principled arguments that make
social change possible.
Essay on the Obduracy of Constitution Fixation, 94 B.U. L. REv. 1141 (2014); and Robin West, The
Aspirational Constitution, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 241, 244-46 (1993), suggesting that "the Constitution
itself is part of the problem, that constitutional constraints are themselves in some way incompatible
with the pursuit of right and justice," and that "the value of constitutionalism itself' is accordingly up for
serious reconsideration.
4. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS, BACKLASH, AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, at x (2013) ("When the Court intervenes to defend a
minority position or even to resolve an issue that divides the country down the middle, its decisions can
generate political backlash .... ); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 415-19 (2d ed. 2008); Reva B. Siegel, Foreword: Equality Divided, 127
HARV. L. REV. 1, 80-81 (2013) (summarizing the scholarship of those concluding that "judgments
challenging customary understandings [...] might even set back the cause because of the backlash they
provoke").
5. See, e.g., Catherine Albiston, The Dark Side of Litigation as a Social Movement Strategy, 96
IOWA L. REV. BULL. 61, 74-76 (2011); Risa L. Goluboff, "We Lives in a Free House Such as It Is":
Class and the Creation of Modern Civil Rights, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 1977, 2015-17 (2003); see also
Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, and the Law: The Case of Affirmative Action, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 1436, 1445 (2005) (arguing the undesirability of having the main focus of the social
movement be the court battle).
6. See, e.g., JAMES E. FLEMING & LINDA C. MCCLAIN, ORDERED LIBERTY: RIGHTS,
RESPONSIBILITIES, AND VIRTUES 1 (2013) ("In recent years, communitarian, civic republican, and
progressive thinkers and politicians have argued that our constitutional system takes individual rights
too seriously, to the neglect of responsibilities, virtues, and the common good."); MARY ANN GLENDON,
RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 48 (1991) ("No aspect of American
rights discourse more tellingly illustrates the isolated character of the rights-bearer than our protean right
of privacy."); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE II (2d ed. 1998) ("The
priority of the subject can only mean the priority of the individual, thus biasing the conception in favor
of individualistic values familiar to the liberal tradition."); Robin West, A Tale of Two Rights, 94 B.U. L.
REV. 893 (2014) (contending that the problem with American constitutional rights talk lies not with the
very idea of rights, but rather with the emergence of "exit" rights as the dominant form of constitutional
rights, and the correlative suppression from that category of "rights to enter" or "civil" rights).
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This Article reconsiders the downsides of efforts to win new constitutional
rights by exploring a lost chapter in the history of the pro-choice movement, a
story many view as the prime example of what goes wrong when a movement
succeeds in the courts. The Article unearths the history of how members of the
pro-choice movement debated, revised, criticized, and ultimately embraced
what many activists consciously saw as a limiting constitutional framework.
Starting in the 1980s, when the support of the Supreme Court for Roe
seemed in doubt, movement members began an intense debate about how-and
whether-to emphasize reproductive rights.7 When the Supreme Court seemed
poised to overrule Roe and leave rights without protection in Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services,8 the National Abortion Rights Action League
(NARAL) urged its members to stop relying on the courts.9 Instead of
abandoning rights rhetoric altogether, NARAL defined rights as just one more
political tool.10 In this view, the courts were political actors, and abortion rights
were only as strong as the number of voters and politicians willing to back it.
Rejecting reliance on the courts or on black letter law, others insisted that
constitutional protections emerged and took meaning from grassroots, direct
action protest, not the courts or other policymakers. In the late 1980s,
antiabortion protestors in organizations like Operation Rescue mounted major
blockades.II Leaders of the National Organization for Women (NOW) came to
believe that a more principled forn of civil disobedience was necessary to
protect abortion rights.12 Dissatisfied with the lobbying and electoral strategy
prioritized by NARAL, NOW members believed that only direct-action protest
could shore up the rights that Roe recognized.'3
Still others, particularly abortion providers, maintained that reliance on the
idea of rights, however defined, hobbled any effort to create a more just
reproductive health care system. Organizing groups like the National Coalition
of Abortion Providers (NCAP), providers working in the early 1990s
illuminated what they saw as a disconnect between the rights-based rhetoric
7. A word about terminology is in order here. The Article uses the term "reproductive health" to
refer to access to obstetric and gynecological services, including contraception and abortion. By
contrast, the Article uses the term "reproductive rights" to describe arguments and strategies predicated
on constitutional protections. Finally, the Article uses the term "reproductive justice" to describe an
approach focused not only on legal protections and individual choice but also on the racial, economic,
social, and cultural constraints that limit women's ability to make certain decisions.
8. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
9. See infra Part 1.
10. Id.
I1. On the history of Operation Rescue and rise of clinic blockades, see, for example, GRACE
ELIZABETH HALE, A NATION OF OUTSIDERS: HOW THE WHITE MIDDLE CLASS FELL IN LOVE WITH
REBELLION IN POSTWAR AMERICA 270-83 (2011); ROBERT WUTHNow, RED STATE RELIGION: FAITH
AND POLITICS IN AMERICA'S HEARTLAND 288-319 (2011); and Faye Ginsburg, Rescuing the Nation:
Operation Rescue and the Rise ofAntiabortion Militance, in ABORTION WARS: A HALF CENTURY OF
STRUGGLE, 1950-2000, at 227, 227-51 (Rickie Solinger ed., 1998).




used by the pro-choice movement and the reality of practice in American
clinics. In particular, providers concluded the idea of a right to abortion did not
capture the full range of concerns voiced by women who terminated a
pregnancy.14 To guarantee meaningful access to abortion, providers wanted to
stop stigmatizing abortion and discuss it in a way that spoke the experiences of
more American women.'5
Studying activists' debates about the value of rights-claiming adds a new
dimension to studies of the dominance and costs of constitutional discourse. On
the one hand, the materials gathered here demonstrate the flexibility and
capaciousness of rights arguments. Contrary to what some commentators have
asserted, the history of the struggle for reproductive health strengthens the case
for the fluidity and adaptability of constitutional rhetoric. While the movement
appeared fixated on the language of rights, this apparent consensus concealed
contests about the meaning, value, and nature of rights.
On the other hand, although many shared an awareness of the drawbacks of
constitutional language, those who challenged a rights-centered approach
sometimes found themselves marginalized in the larger pro-choice movement.
Constitutional discourse attracted movement members independently of the
influence of lawyers or litigators. Indeed, many movement leaders committed
more to the language of rights at a time when activists had lost faith in the
courts. The history of the movement suggests that the pull of constitutional
discourse may be greater-and less tethered to the courts-than some studies
have made plain.
The Article proceeds in five parts. Part I sets the stage for battles about the
use of constitutional discourse, detailing activists' disillusionment with court-
centered strategies in the 1980s and 1990s. As this Part shows, leading
movement organizations anxious about the judiciary did not reject
constitutional rhetoric; far from it. Part I focuses on the work of NARAL, a
group founded in 1969 to advocate for the legalization of abortion.'6 After
1973, NARAL continued to focus on keeping abortion legal and acceptable,
although the organization also broadened its focus to include sex education,
birth control, and health care for women and children.'7 As the courts retreated
from protecting abortion rights, NARAL shifted focus, working primarily to
protect legal abortion in Congress and the courts. However, NARAL did more
than simply adopt new tactics. In adopting this strategy, NARAL members also
14. See infra Part 1ll.
15. Id.
16. On the founding and original goals of NARAL, see, for example, SUZANNE STAGGENBORG,
THE PRO-CHOICE MOVEMENT: ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVISM IN THE ABORTION CONFLICT 18-24, 51-
52 (1991); and MARY ZIEGLER, AFTER ROE: THE LOST HISTORY OF THE ABORTION DEBATE 102-05
(2015).
17. NARAL currently emphasizes its focus on a full range of reproductive services. See, e.g.,
NARAL Pro-Choice America Mission Statement (July 20, 2015),
http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/about-us/mission-statements.html.
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described rights in different terms. While many in the organization still
believed that the Constitution did protect abortion, leaders argued that in
practical terms, rights depended entirely on the will of politicians and voters.
To protect the right to choose, NARAL had to frame it in a way that resonated
with the public. Enforcement of women's rights, the group's leaders argued,
relied on the public, not the Constitution or the courts.
Part 11 studies an alternative idea about the enforcement of rights.
Particularly within NOW, feminists insisted that politics offered a hope as false
as the one some had seen in the courts. First organized in 1966, NOW took on a
broad reform agenda designed to guarantee sex equality. While NOW leaders
began working on the abortion issue in 1968, the organization always pursued a
broader agenda.19 While NOW worked with NARAL in the political arena,
leaders of the former began arguing that women could not depend on
politicians or voters to enforce their rights. Members of NOW increasingly
believed that feminists had secured abortion rights only engaging in civil
disobedience. According to this view, women and providers could enforce their
own rights by ensuring that the procedure remained available whatever the state
of the black letter law.
Part III lays bare the tradeoffs involved in the movement's reinvention of
rights. Convinced that constitutional discourse had crowded out valuable
arguments, as this Part shows, mobilized providers tried to chart a new course
for the movement. This part focuses on debates within two provider
organizations, the National Abortion Federation (NAF) and the National
Coalition of Abortion Providers (NCAP). Founded in 1977, NAF served as a
source of support, training, and political advocacy for providers.20 Organized in
1990, NCAP primarily represented the interests of independent clinics
sometimes marginalized in NAF, a group that also included Planned
Parenthood and independent physicians.21 In the mid-1990s, NCAP leaders
began arguing that rights discourse hamstrung the movement, regardless of
how activists conceptualized constitutional rights or developed novel
arguments about how the movement could enforce those rights. NCAP leaders
worried that rights discourse did nothing to address the reasons many women
chose abortion. Worse, rights language did not capture the moral or emotional
complexity of the abortion experience-something providers felt was crucial in
justifying women's control of their reproductive lives. Ultimately, however,
mainstream organizations rejected the change in direction providers proposed,
choosing to preserve tenuous victories.
18. On the founding and early priorities of NOW, see, for example, MARYANN BARASKO,
GOVERNING NOW: GRASSROOTS ACTIVISM IN THE NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR WOMEN 11-60
(2004); and ZIEGLER, supra note 16, at 110-15.
19. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
20. For discussion of the founding of NAF, see infra Part Ill.
21. For discussion of the founding and early years of NCAP, see infra Part Ill.
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Part IV places this history within the larger scholarly literature on both
constitutional discourse and reproductive justice. The materials assembled here
tell a contradictory story about the language of rights, showing how it can
accommodate a wide variety of demands for change while constraining those
who challenge it. Significantly, this history also illuminates the political
contingency of scholars' and activists' contemporary turn to reproductive
justice-a focus not only on legal access and individual choice but also on the
racial, economic, social, and cultural constraints that shape women's decisions.
Histories of the reproductive justice movement often begin in 1994,
spotlighting its emergence in the context of international human rights. The
Article tells a much longer story, showing how movement contests and political
setbacks helped to change the fortunes of those invested in reproductive justice.
The future of such claims may be as hard to predict.
1. MAKING RIGHTS A PART OF ORDINARY POLITICS
NARAL, a leader in the pro-choice movement, began experimenting with
different ideas about constitutional rights in the wake of stinging defeats in the
courts. Earlier in the 1980s, members of the group worried that they had done
too little to connect emotionally to an ambivalent public. By focusing on the
right to choose, NARAL members wondered if they had done too little to
explain why women actually terminated pregnancies. Similarly, by not
explaining when abortion was justified, NARAL members had not challenged
the stigma pro-lifers had long built around abortion. While assuming that the
courts would still protect abortion rights, NARAL leaders developed a message
that members hoped would strike a chord with women, particularly poor and
non-white women often left out by mainstream activism. The organization
asked women to publicly talk about their abortion experiences and to explain
how access to abortion had improved their lives.
Later in the 1980s, when the Supreme Court seemed ready to overrule Roe,
the organization reversed course, instead looking to Congress and state
legislatures to protect abortion. However, NARAL did not simply change
tactics. Members of the group also argued that enforcement of any
constitutional guarantee depended at least partly on voters and politicians. As a
result, NARAL leaders changed their rights-based arguments, focusing on
efforts to maximize popular support and sway undecided legislators.
This Part begins by exploring the rhetorical strategies NARAL developed
in the early 1980s when members were convinced that the courts were on their
side. After the justices retreated from Roe in the mid-I 980s, as the Part shows
next, NARAL leaders developed a new idea of what rights really involved.
Rather than looking to the courts, members argued that the political branches
gradually gave meaning to the guarantees spelled out in the constitutional text.
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As members increasingly accepted this definition of rights, the organization
transformed its arguments and tactical approach.
A. Assuming the Support of the Courts, NARAL Experiments with a
Bolder Approach
For more than a decade after the Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade in
1973, few movement members had questioned the commitment of the judiciary
to legal abortion.2 2 Supporters of legal abortion recognized that there was no
guarantee of success in the courts, since prior to 1989, the movement had
suffered significant setbacks, particularly in the context of abortion funding.23
In 1977, the Supreme Court decided a trio of cases, Maher v. Roe, Poelker v.
Doe, and Beal v. Doe, that paved the way for more state legislation banning the
24use of public dollars or facilities for abortion. By 1980, in Harris v. McRae,
the Court had upheld federal legislation outlawing most Medicaid funding for
25abortion. Just the same, the Court had cast little doubt on the validity of the
abortion right itself. For example, in 1983 in City of Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, a six-to-three majority struck down a multi-restriction
statute many had seen as a model for antiabortion legislation.26
Activists believed that they could succeed if they could convince the public
to support abortion as strongly as the courts. In 1985, NARAL members
seeking to accomplish this goal promised to make women's experiences the
27center of the abortion debate. An antiabortion film, The Silent Scream,
sparked concerns that feminists had settled for a framework centered on
physicians' prerogatives rather than women's needs.28 Produced by Crusade for
Life, an antiabortion group, the film narrated the suction abortion of a twelve-
week old fetus.29 With a voiceover by former NARAL leader Bernard
22. On the movement's early reliance on the courts, see, for example, Jack M. Balkin, Roe v.
Wade: An Engine of Controversy, in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID: AMERICA'S TOP LEGAL
EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA'S MOST CONTROVERSIAL DECISION 12 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2005),
explaining, "Reliance on the courts, in turn, diverted political energy away from forming a mass political
movement for abortion rights"; and ROSENBERG, supra note 4, at 423, discussing how "In the abortion
field, reliance on the Court seriously weakened the political efficacy of pro-choice forces."
23. See Mary Ziegler, The Price of Privacy, 1973 to the Present, 37 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 285,
295 (2014).
24. See Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1977) (sustaining a ban on the use of St. Louis
public hospitals for abortion); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 470-78 (1977) (upholding a Connecticut
Medicaid funding ban on abortion); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 445-54 (1977) (upholding a
Pennsylvania law that limited Medicaid funding for abortions).
25. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
26. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
27. For discussion of this effort, see, for example, WILLIAM SALETAN, BEARING RIGHT: How
CONSERVATIVES WON THE ABORTION WARS 37, 64-69, 79 (2004); and STAGGENBORG, supra note 16,
at 128.
28. Part 1, infra, later discusses these concerns.




Nathanson, the film claimed to depict "a child's mouth open in a silent
scream"'-"the reaction of a child imminently threatened with extinction."30
While The Silent Scream traded in familiar pro-life images and arguments,
the film attracted unprecedented attention, with screenings on high school and
college campuses across the nation and an endorsement from President Ronald
Reagan.3 ' The waves made by the film convinced feminists of the need to focus
less on the rights set forth in Roe and more on why women needed reproductive
liberty. In a February letter to Judy Goldsmith, then president of the National
Organization for Women (NOW), NARAL leader Nanette Falkenberg
wondered how activists could overcome the "sense of powerlessness and
frustration among our supporters and other pro-choice individuals."32
Falkenberg saw a fatal flaw in the way advocates had used rights-seeking to
preserve them without fully explaining their justification. As Falkenberg
explained, the movement could make progress only if it "recapture[d] the
emotional side of the issue."33
Rather than praising the abstract importance of choice, NARAL leaders
launched Silent No More, a campaign designed to make a moral case for legal
abortion. "We must not focus only on the hardship cases," Falkenberg argued
in 1985. "Those abortions are not the only ones that are justifiable or 'right."' 3 4
Silent No More specifically targeted poor women and women of color for
whom abstract notions of choice and freedom rang hollow while tackling the
moral questions often raised by abortion opponents.35 As Falkenberg insisted:
"We must begin to build a sense of the 'morality' of women needing to retain
that right." 36
Silent No More promoted not only a new rhetorical strategy but also a
broader vision of the movement's reform agenda. In March 1985, the NARAL
Foundation hosted a strategy weekend, inviting key litigators, activists, and
consultants from a variety of reproductive-rights organizations.37 Those present
rejected a single-issue approach, instead calling for "real choices about having
30. D.Y. Johnson, "Graphic in the Extreme": Anti-Abortion Doctor Plans Follow-Up Film, L.A.
TIMEs, Dec. 5, 1985, at 1; see also Stephen Champman, Abortion and the Silent Scream, CHI. TRIBUNE,
Mar. 17, 1985, at 3.
31. See, e.g., Bertrand Marotte, Group Will Use Film in Fight Over Abortion, GLOBE & MAIL, Apr.
1, 1985, at 16.
32. Letter from Nanette Falkenberg to Judy Goldsmith (Feb. 1, 1985) (on file with Harvard
University, Schlesinger Library, The NOW Papers, Box 8, Folder 1).
33. Id.
34. Letter from Nanette Falkenberg to NARAL Leadership, Re: Action (n.d., c. 1985) (on file with
Harvard University, Schlesinger Library, The NARAL Pro-Choice Massachusetts Papers, Box 16,
Folder 14).
35. See, e.g., Ziegler, supra note 23, at 302-05 (citing Memorandum, Impact of Focus on Women
Strategy Weekend on "Silent No More," (Apr. 29, 1985) (on file with Harvard University, Schlesinger
Library, The NARAL Pro-Choice Massachusetts Papers, Box 16, Folder 14)).
36. Letter from Falkenberg to NARAL Leadership, supra note 34.
37. See NARAL Strategy Weekend: Summary of Second Session (n.d., c. 1985) (on file with
Harvard University, Schlesinger Library, The NARAL Papers, Accession 11, Box 185, Folder 6).
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children," including "real health care, including prenatal care; child care;
supportive services (e.g. for [the]disabled); [and] education."3 8 Members of the
group explicitly connected reproductive and sexual liberty by incorporating
"seek[ing] and hav[ing] a right to seek sexual pleasure" in their vision as "a
positive good."39 Nor did attendees want to conceal the moral and emotional
nuances of abortion for many women. In de-stigmatizing the procedure,
attendees hoped both to acknowledge the complexity of abortion and to
convince the public that the "decision not to have kids is valued as a moral
decision-[that] women are seen as moral agents."4o Activists hoped not only
to "put the focus back on women's lives, but also [to] use our polling and focus
group information to capitalize on the messages that work best with different
demographic groups."A
When relying on the Supreme Court, activists had assumed that while the
Constitution protected abortion rights, the public needed convincing. However,
by the late 1980s, NARAL members no longer trusted the courts, and it seemed
more than possible that the justices would overrule Roe. In Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists , the majority in favor of
preserving Roe had shrunk, with only five members of the court voting to strike
42
down a challenged Pennsylvania law. In 1987, when Justice Lewis F. Powell
retired, the power of the president to reshape the Court seemed beyond
question.4 3 Although progressive activists defeated the nomination of Robert
Bork, Ronald Reagan still selected Powell's replacement." The votes to
overrule Roe seemed to have fallen into place.45
38. Id. at 2.
39. Id.
40. Id.; see also Memorandum from Nanette Falkenberg, Executive Director, NARAL, to Members
of the Media (Mar. 20, 1985) (on file with Harvard University, Schlesinger Library, The NARAL
Papers, Accession II, Box 185, Folder 5).
41. NARAL Memorandum, Overall Strategy: Capture the Climate/ Politicize/Polarize the Battle
(Nov. 17, 1988) (on file with Harvard University, Schlesinger Library, The NARAL Papers, Accession
11, Box 204, Folder 16).
42. See Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 749, 772
(1986).
43. For coverage of Justice Powell's retirement, see, for example, Mike Kaszuba & Kate Parry,
Powell's Retirement Turns Spotlight on Battle for Abortion, STAR TRIB., June 27, 1987, at 8A; Walter
V. Robinson, Justice Powell Quits, Cites Ill Health, BOS. GLOBE, June 27, 1987, at 1; and Glen Elsasser
& Janet Cawley, Powell Quits Supreme Court, CHI. TRIB., June 27, 1987, at 1.
44. On Reagan's effort to remake the Court, see, for example, BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE
PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 394-95 (2000); JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG, SUPREME CONFLICT: THE
INSIDE STORY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 85 (2007); and THOMAS M.
KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST COURT IN HISTORY: THE ROAD TO MODERN JUDICIAL CONSERVATISM 156-
96 (2008).
45. Justice Anthony Kennedy, Powell's replacement, would become the swing vote on abortion
issues. See, e.g., Caitlin E. Borgmann, Abortion, The Undue Burden Standard, and The Evisceration of
Women's Privacy, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 291, 311 (2010); Priscilla J. Smith, Give Justice
Ginsburg What She Wants: Using Sex Equality Arguments to Demand Examination of the Legitimacy of
State Interests in Abortion Regulation, 34 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 377, 403 (2011). Although Kennedy
joined a plurality in Webster upholding an antiabortion law, see Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492
U.S. 490, 498-500 (1989), he helped to author the plurality in Casey upholding what the Court called the
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B. Questioning the Future in the Courts, NARAL Members Redefine Rights
With the Court's support in question, activists committed to legal abortion
began concluding that they had invested too much in protecting abortion rights
through the courts. Under the leadership of Kate Michelman, NARAL had
already reconsidered advocates' reliance on both litigation and constitutional
discourse. A March 1987 strategy memorandum stressed that organizers would
not be able to rely as heavily on the federal courts and would have to turn
46instead to Congress and state legislatures. As the memorandum explained,
depending on the courts had failed to distinguish NARAL from other pro-
choice groups competing for recruits and dollars. Predicting an increase in
competition for dollars and recruits within the pro-choice movement, the
memorandum urged NARAL members to develop a strategy that would set the
organization apart.47
NARAL's fresh focus on lobbying and ordinary politics prompted leaders
of the group to rearticulate what reproductive rights were and who enforced
them. Particularly when talking to external audiences, group members
maintained that the Constitution and the courts protected a woman's right to
choose abortion. On some occasions, NARAL leaders did tell voters and
members of the public that they could effectively force the Supreme Court to
preserve abortion rights. In internal discussions, however, NARAL leaders
drew a more radical conclusion, suggesting that enforcement of that right
depended on voters and their elected representatives. NARAL members argued
that success in the courts depended almost entirely on political pressure.
Viewing the courts as part of-the political process, NARAL activists argued
that the constitutional right to choose would have meaning only if the group
could build popular support and win allies in Congress. Moreover, NARAL
leaders argued that elected officials could themselves enforce rights as well as
could the courts. If rights always were part of popular politics, NARAL leaders
would discount any distinction between constitutional law and ordinary
politics, presenting rights discourse as a tool for manipulating voters and
politicians. Second, NARAL members retooled their vision of the Constitution
to maximize popular support, describing legal abortion in terms the public
would embrace.
Instead of setting aside constitutional discourse, NARAL leaders planned
to "put an end to the perception that momentum is against us."48 In November,
"essential" holding of Roe. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 845-46 (1992)
(plurality opinion). In the mid-1980s, however, NARAL leaders worried that any Justice replacing
Powell would put abortion rights at risk. This Part next discusses the organization's response.
46. Ziegler, supra note 23, at 304-06.
47. Id.
48. Kate Michelman to NARAL Friends (Dec. 21, 1988) (on file with Harvard University,
Schlesinger Library, The NARAL Papers, Accession II, Box 205, Folder 8). Earlier in 1988, NARAL
had already begun emphasizing the idea of a pro-choice majority. See Poll Reveals Continued Support
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in an internal conversation about tactics, NARAL leaders laid out a strategy for
changing the course of the struggle. By "polariz[ing] the battle" and recapturing
the way the public understood the issue, activists could create a majority that
would force the Court to preserve legal abortion.49 Mobilizing support for legal
abortion meant "[c]reat[ing] a climate that makes it unacceptable to overturn
Roe v. Wade."5 0 Although NARAL leaders still sought to preserve Roe in the
courts, leaders of the group argued that the courts were part of, not removed
from, ordinary politics. To win in court, NARAL would have to maximize
popular support for its cause.
Making rights synonymous with public support would also help activists
make the case in Congress for protecting legal abortion. Selling the idea of a
pro-choice majority proved essential for activists convinced that the movement
"need[ed] to . . . begin acting immediately as though our position is
strengthened (not weakened) in this new [C]ongress."5 1 Without wins, as the
memorandum explained, the movement could not "keep pro-choice morale up
or [. . . have] credibility with politicians."5 2 The only message a majority
seemed to support involved a variation on the theme of privacy rights identified
with the original Roe decision. While most Americans felt ambivalent about
abortion, most voters understood "the absolutely compelling need to keep
reproductive rights free from government intrusion."53
Between 1988 and 1989, NARAL crafted a contradictory idea of rights-
focusing on the constitutional significance of privacy while treating rights as
the product of political pressure. In
December 1988, in seeking to create a uniform message for NARAL
members, the affiliate development department circulated a pledge stating:
I believe deeply that our Constitution embodies the intensely personal
and private right of a woman to decide when [. . .] to have children ...
or not to have children. I believe that this decision must be free of
government intrusion.
I believe the U.S. Supreme Court correctly affirmed this principle
16 years ago in Roe v. Wade. . . .54
for Choice, NARAL News, Spring 1988, at 1 (on file with Duke University, Bingham Library, The Takey
Christ Papers, Box 23, NARAL News Folder).




53. Kate Michelman to NARAL Friends, supra note 48, at 1-2.
54. "Pledge" Statement of Principle I (n.d., c. 1988) (on file with Harvard University, Schlesinger
Library, The NARAL Papers, Accession H, Box 205, Folder 8); see also Kate Michelman to NARAL
Friends, supra note 48, at 1-2 (describing the initiative to "activate the pro-choice majority," in part by
soliciting signatures for the pledge).
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Emphasizing freedom from government interference promised to appeal to
a wide variety of voters, particularly when NARAL members could tie their
claims to a venerable constitutional tradition. At the same time, however,
NARAL leaders asserted that rights depended almost entirely on the vagaries of
ordinary politics. Rather than protecting reproductive freedom from popular
majorities, NARAL would "create a climate in which it [was] unacceptable to
erode or overrule Roe."55
NARAL's redefinition of rights continued in January 1989, when the Court
granted certiorari n Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, a case addressing
the constitutionality of a multi-restriction Missouri law.56 By mobilizing a
majority, NARAL leaders hoped not only to intimidate the Court but also to
build support among voters and politicians convinced of the importance of
selecting new justices. Creating and popularizing political protections would
allow NARAL to "create a political climate in which it [was] unacceptable to
erode or overrule Roe."57
In the lead-up to and aftermath of Webster, NARAL's Who Decides
campaign revealed more about what it meant to define rights as a part of
ordinary politics. In defining a "win," an internal memorandum highlighted
"evidence of numbers and potential power of pro-choice majority."5 If rights
emerged from ordinary politics, NARAL would describe the Constitution only
in terms that ambivalent citizens could embrace. As NARAL consultant Jackie
Blumenthal explained in describing the group's new rhetorical agenda: "The
main thrust of the theme-'you or them'-is a populist message designed to
reach a broad cross-section of Americans.59
Over the course of 1989, in defining rights as political, NARAL leaders
further committed to only those substantive protections a majority supported.
NARAL's emphasis on politics partly resulted from the Court's decision in
Webster. While not overruling Roe, a divided plurality upheld much of a multi-
55. Memorandum, Affiliate Development Department to Affiliates 1-2 (Dec. 25, 1988), (on file
with Harvard University, Schlesinger Library, The NARAL Papers, Accession II, Box 205, Folder 8).
56. See Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
57. Letter from NARAL Affiliate Development Department to Affiliates (Dec. 23, 1988) (on file
with Harvard University, Schlesinger Library, The NARAL Papers, Accession II, Box 204, Folder 8);
see also Letter from Kate Michelman, Executive Director, NARAL, to Advocate Team Leader (Jan.
1989) (on file with Harvard University, Schlesinger Library, The NARAL Papers, Accession II, Box
208, Folder 5) (cover letter for an action packet to help advocates gamer public support for abortion
rights). For more on NARAL's commitment to electoral politics, see Mary T. Schmich, An Explosive
Issue's Leading Crusaders, CHI. TRIB., July 24, 1989, at 1; Abortion Rights League Launches Ad
Campaign, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, May 31, 1989, at 2A; Jeffrey L. Rabin, Money, Packaging, L.A.
TIMES, July 26, 1989, at 1.
58. NARAL Meeting Agenda (Mar. 8, 1989) (on file with Harvard University, Schlesinger Library,
The NARAL Papers, Accession II, Box 208, Folder 9).
59. Letter from Jackie Blumenthal & Podesta Associates to Nikki Heidepriem 2 (Mar. 13, 1989)
(on file with Harvard University, Schlesinger Library, The NARAL Papers, Accession II, Box 208,
Folder 9); see also Memorandum from Hickman-Maslin Research Team to NARAL, Re: Do s and
Don'ts (Mar. 22, 1989) (on file with Harvard University, Schlesinger Library, The NARAL Papers,
Accession II, Box 208, Folder 9).
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part Missouri statute.6 0 The most telling part of Webster involved a fetal-
viability provision. Under this portion of the Missouri law, physicians had a
duty to consider whether a pregnancy had reached the twentieth week or
beyond.6' If so, a provider had to make independent medical findings on fetal
viability.62
The doctors and clinics challenging the law argued that it violated Roe by
substituting the judgment of the government for the protected discretion of
doctors. Writing for two other justices, Chief Justice William Rehnquist
identified any conflict between the statute and the 1973 decision as evidence
not that the Missouri law was flawed, but rather that Roe was "unsound in
principle and unworkable in practice."63  Justice Antonin Scalia wrote
separately to state more explicitly that the Court should overrule Roe
altogether.64 Having written skeptically about the trimester framework, Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor did not join the plurality because she believed that the
viability provision did not conflict with Roe, rendering reconsideration of the
decision unnecessary.
Webster intensified interest in a definition of rights reliant on popular
majorities and ordinary politics. First, Webster dashed any remaining hope that
the Court would protect abortion rights in the near term. "We would like for it
not to be a political battle in every state, every community, every locale,"
Michelman told the media in the aftermath of Webster, "but the court has given
it over to political action."66 Second, Webster helped to mobilize supporters of
legal abortion, allowing NARAL to engineer large-scale protests, campaign
effectively in state and local elections, fend off some new restrictions in the
states, and make a push for pro-choice legislation at the federal level.6 7
For NARAL, a federal solution seemed particularly compelling-a way to
avoid the state-by-state struggle that seemed to only chip away at abortion
rights.68 In addition to considering a proposed constitutional amendment,
NARAL focused on the Freedom of Choice Act (FOCA), a federal law that
would codify the 1973 Roe decision.69 As one activist explained, FOCA began
60. See Webster, 492 U.S. at 514-18.
61. See id. at 513-16.
62. See id.
63. Id. at 518.
64. See id. at 532-37 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
65. See id. at 522-32. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part).
66. Nene Foxhall, Abortion Rights Group Targets Texas Races, HOUS. CHRON., Sept. 12, 1989, at
A27; see also Martha Shirk, Abortion Rights Leader Vows Victory, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 10,
1989, at 4B (Michelman explaining that NARAL could no longer rely on the judiciary).
67. On NARAL's post-Webster strategy, see, for example, Steve Berg, Political Landscape on
Abortion Issue Shifis, STAR TRIB., Oct. 15, 1989, at IA; Christine Bertelson, Abortion-Rights Group
Plan Education, Legislation Drive, ST. LOuis POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 31, 1989, at 6A; and Rob Karwath,
Abortion Rights Group Praises Edgar and Criticizes Hartigan, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 23, 1989, at 8.
68. See, e.g., SALETAN, supra note 27, at 222; STAGGENBORG, supra note 16, at 141.
69. See, e.g., STAGGENBORG, supra note 16, at 141; William Saletan, Electoral Politics and
Abortion: Narrowing the Message, in ABORTION WARS, supra note 11, at 111, 122.
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as "a vehicle to energize and organize the grassroots," "a tool for educating
Congress and the public about the abortion issue in general."70
FOCA represented a way out of a messy state-by-state fight that Webster
inspired. Between 1989 and April 1991, seven states introduced new abortion
restrictions, and 200 more bills were pending.7' In July 1990, when Justice
William Brennan, a consistent vote in favor of legal abortion, announced his
72retirement, pro-life groups seemed to enjoy an even stronger position. When
Justice Thurgood Marshall stepped down from the Court in the summer of 1991
and the Supreme Court agreed to hear another abortion case the following
January, FOCA seemed to be the only way out of endless battles in the states.
Prepared for defeat in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey,74 the next challenge to Roe to arrive at the Court, Michelman and her
colleagues at NARAL hoped to use what they foresaw as an inevitable setback
to surpass the momentum for FOCA built after Webster. As Michelman
explained in April, NARAL would remind politicians of the force of a
supposed pro-choice majority, sending "a message to every office-holder and
every office-seeker in America."75
In 1992, when the Supreme Court decided Casey, FOCA seemed much
more than a mobilizing tool for NARAL activists dedicated to political
protections for abortion. Contrary to what many had expected, the Court
preserved what the plurality called the "essential holding" of Roe v. Wade,
declaring once again that the Constitution protected abortion.76 However,
70. Letter from Ron Fitzsimmons to Peg Johnston, enclosed Summary ofIssues I (May I1, 1990)
(on file with Duke University, Bingham Library, The Peg Johnston Papers, Box 1, NAF Feminist
Caucus Folder).
71. See, e.g., Mimi Hall, Abortion Fight Sheifts Gears, USA TODAY, Apr. 30, 1991, at 3A. For more
on the push for new state laws, see Dan Balz & Ruth Marcus, In Year Since Webster, Abortion Debate
Defies Prediction, WASH. POST July 3, 1990,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1 990/07/03/in-year-since-webster-abortion-debate-
defies-predictions/b30df2ea-8ea8-4a3f-b29f- I 740df63 760; Linda Feldmann, States Stitching
Patchwork Quilt of Abortion Laws, CHRISTIAN Sl. MONITOR, Nov. 7, 1990,
http://www.csmonitor.com/1990/1107/aweb.html; and Dawn M. Weyrich, Pro-Lifers Seek New Tools in
Old Laws, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1989, at A4.
72. On Justice Brennan's retirement, see, for example, Curtis J. Sitomer, The Brennan Legacy,
CHRISTIAN SCL MONITOR, Aug. 2, 1990, http://www.csmonitor.com/1990/0802/dbren.html; Ailing
Brennan, Key Liberal, Resigns from Court, BOS. GLOBE, July 21, 1990, at 1; and Justice Brennan
Retires from the Court, S.F. CHRON., July 21, 1990, at Al.
73. On Justice Marshall's retirement, see, for example, Andrew Rosenthal, Marshall Retires from
High Court: Blow to Liberals, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1991, at Al;; Stephen Wermiel, Conservatives Lock
Up Control of Court After Marshall Retires, WALL ST. J., June 28, 1991, at Al; and Marshall Finalizes
Court Retirement, L.A. TIMES,Oct. 2, 1991, http://articles.latimes.com/1991-10-02/news/mn-
2810 1 _marshall-retirement-court. For coverage of the threat posed by Casey, see Linda P. Campbell,
Abortion Rights: Pennsylvania Case Could Test Roe, CHI. TRIB. Jan. 19, 1992,
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1992-01-19/features/9201060308_I_spousal-notification-abortion-
rights-groups-abortion-rights; PA Case Could Soon Put Roe v. Wade in Jeopardy, PHILA. INQUIRER,
Jan. 3, 1992, at B3; and Abortion Foes, Backers to Rally, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Jan. 21, 1992, at 3A.
74. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion).
75. Joe Frolik, Today's Pro-Choice March Called Last Chance, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Apr. 5,
1992, at A3.
76. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.
2016] 117
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
Casey set aside the trimester framework, adopting a less rigorous undue burden
test that seemed likely to lead to more rather than less regulation at the state
level. Under Casey, a law violated the Constitution if it had "the purpose or
effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an
abortion of a nonviable fetus."7 7Applying this test, Casey upheld all but one of
the provisions of a challenged Pennsylvania law, convincing commentators that
the Court had substantially undercut protections for abortion rights.78 Given the
Court's apparent receptivity to state abortion regulations,7 9 FOCA seemed to be
the best way to preserve access to the procedure.so
After Casey, the fight for FOCA intensified, exposing deep disagreements
within the movement about whether abortion rights should depend on ordinary
politics. Two versions of the bill emerged in Congress, a Senate version with
added restrictions and a House version without.8' A majority seemed ready to
pass a narrow version, but other supporters of legal abortion, particularly
leaders of NOW, prevailed on members of Congress not to bring the bill up for
a vote because it did too little to protect the abortion right.82 In December, the
idea of a political abortion right exposed a deeper division between NARAL
and other organizations in favor of legal abortion. The 1992 midterm
elections secured a pro-choice majority in Congress, but disagreements within
the movement intensified.8 4
FOCA continued to spark strife in 1993, when Congress again considered
two competing versions of statutory abortion rights. NARAL championed the
Senate version-a moderate measure that would still create protections broader
than those in Casey, allowing states to pass laws only on abortion funding,
77. Id. at 877. On the perception that Casey was less protective than Roe, see, for example, Julie
Schrager, Letter to the Editor, The Impact ofCasey, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 1331, 1331-32; Robin L.
West, The Nature of the Right to an Abortion: A Commentary on Professor Brownstein's Analysis
ofCasey, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 961, 966-67 (1994); Another Blow Against Roe, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH,
June 30, 1992, at 2B; Frances Kissling, Pro-Choice Must Widen Its Agenda; Reproductive Rights Are in
Peril, Not Just Abortion Rights, L.A. TIMES (June 30, 1992), http://articles.latimes.com/1992-06-
30/local/me- l 150_1_abortion-rights.
78. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 879-901.
79. See id.
80. On the perceived importance of FOCA as a source of protection for abortion, see Mary Crisp
Dent, A National Law on Abortion? Yes: It Is the Only Real Hope for Women's Rights, Health, Lives,
ORLANDO SENTINEL (July 5, 1992), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/1992-07-
05/news/9207020162_1 freedom-of-choice-choice-act-pass-the-freedom; James A. Finefrock, Freedom
of Choice, SAN. FRAN. EXAMINER, July 29, 1992, at A16; Court Expected to Launch Abortion Battle on
Hill, WASH. POST, June 26, 1992, at A4.
81. See, e.g., Clean Abortion Bill Swept Aside, DENVER ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Sept. 17, 1992,
at 56.
82. See id.
83. See, e.g., Linda Feldmann, New Congress May Find Little Agreement on Abortion Rights Bill,
CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR, Dec. 1, 1992, at 1.
84. See, e.g., id.
85. See, e.g., Elizabeth Ross, Freedom of Choice Act Splits Activists in Pro-Choice Movement,
CHRISTIAN SCL MONITOR (Apr. 9, 1993), http://www.csmonitor.com/1993/0409/09022.html; Alissa
Rubin, Abortion-Rights Bill Stalls as Pressure, Interest Wanes, DENVER ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, May
16, 1993, at 44A.
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public facilities, and parental consultation. NOW, among other organizations,
favored the House version, a bill that made no exceptions beyond a narrow rule
on conscientious objection.87
The division between the two sides arose partly because NOW leaders
preferred a different approach to the enforcement of rights. To be sure,
movement members could and did pursue a number of alternative strategies for
preserving access to legal abortion. However, at times, NOW leaders
questioned the value of protections that depended on elected officials. As NOW
leader Patricia Ireland explained: "If we have to continue to fight [the abortion
issue] in 50 state capitals, then I am not clear what the point is with moving
ahead with the Freedom of Choice Act."88 By contrast, by defining rights as a
part of ordinary politics, NARAL leaders happily settled for protections that
could be gradually expanded and redefined. Kate Michelman of NARAL put
the point bluntly: "Not to take advantage of this political climate would be [. .
the ultimate strategic error."89
By the summer of 1993, the campaign for FOCA had fallen apart. In July,
Senator Carol Moseley-Braun (D-1ll.) withdrew her support for the bill, arguing
that politically limited rights betrayed both poor women and the principles of
the movement.90 By September, supporters of the bill admitted that it was dead,
indefinitely postponed while pro-choice activists pursued other goals.91 Just the
same, the rift revealed by the FOCA battle ran deeper. NOW leaders worked
with NARAL on political campaigns to shore up abortion rights, but leaders of
the organization often spotlighted an alternative strategy for defining and
enforcing constitutional rights-one that relied on grassroots activism.
As Part II explores, the decisions of Webster and Casey, together with the
mobilization of Operation Rescue and the expansion of clinic blockades and the
fight for FOCA, encouraged NOW members to reconsider how women could
enforce constitutional protections. Rather than relying on politicians or legal
authorities, as NOW leaders argued, women would have a meaningful right
only if providers and patients enforced it themselves.
86. See Ross, supra note 85. On which version of FOCA NARAL supported, see William
Freivogel, Abortion Rights Allies at Odds, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, July 18, 1993, at lB.
87. See Ross, supra note 85.
88. Id.
89. Robin Toner, Abortion-Rights Backers Reassess Strategy, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Apr. 25,
1993, at 37A.
90. See Elaine S. Povich, Abortion Rights Bill Rejected by Moseley-Braun, CHI. TRIB. (July 10,
1993), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1993-07-10/news/9307100041 _ freedom-of-choice-act-
abortion-rights-bill-sen-carol-moseley-braun; Sponsor of Pro-Choice Bill Withdraws Backing, SAN.
FRAN. CHRON., July 10, 1993, at A8.
91. See, e.g., A Choice Impasse, NEWSDAY, Sept. 20, 1993, at 20; Editorial, Some Abortion Rights
Progress, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 20, 1993, at 8A.
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II. RIGHTS WITHOUT RELIANCE ON LEGAL AUTHORITY
While supporting core legislative initiatives like FOCA, NOW leaders
forged a very different idea of rights, one centered on non-violent civil
disobedience. NOW leaders embraced the same constitutional discourse that
defined NARAL advocacy and often worked side by side with NARAL. At the
same time, the idea of an abortion right articulated by NOW leaders
accommodated radically different ideas about what rights were, who had the
power to define them, and how they advanced social change. Frustrated by
unreliable politicians and constant compromise, NOW members concluded that
rights depended on neither Congress nor the courts. If providers were willing to
perform abortions, and women continued to demand them, lawmakers would
have to act, and women would have access to abortion rights.
This Part begins by exploring the root causes of NOW's effort to identify a
new enforcement mechanism for reproductive rights. Next, in studying NOW's
response to an uptick in antiabortion violence, this Part examines how
organization leaders experimented with different ideas about rights in
developing a uniquely feminist brand of civil disobedience. Group members
ultimately concluded that courts and legislators recognized constitutional rights
only as the end result of grassroots protest. As importantly, women and
providers played a crucial role in the enforcement of rights, dictating whether
women actually had access to reproductive health services.
A. NOWLeaders Lose Faith in Existing Political and Legal Strategies
NOW's disillusionment with the movement's political strategy was
gradual. Members of the organization had voted to endorse abortion rights in
1967,92 but prior to the mid-1980s, NOW had prioritized the Equal Rights
Amendment (ERA), a measure that would have explicitly written sex equality
into the federal Constitution.93 By 1984, when efforts to resurrect the ERA had
become primarily symbolic and abortion opponents had attacked several
clinics, leaders of the group channeled more energy into the abortion struggle.94
As early as 1985, NOW began to craft an alternative strategy for protecting
92. On the NOW abortion endorsement, see, for example, GENE BURNS, THE MORAL VETO:
FRAMING CONTRACEPTION, ABORTION, AND CULTURAL PLURALISM IN THE UNITED STATES 212 (2005);
and MARC STEIN, SEXUAL INJUSTICE: SUPREME COURT DECISIONS FROM GRISWOLD TO ROE 116
(2010).
93. On NOW's prioritization of the ERA, see, for example, LINDA M. BLUM, BETWEEN FEMINISM
AND LABOR: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE COMPARATIVE WORTH MOVEMENT 41 (1991); and William H.
Chafe, The Road to Equality: 1962 to Today, in No SMALL COURAGE: A HISTORY OF WOMEN IN THE
UNITED STATES 544-45 (Nancy F. Cott ed., 2000).
94. On NOW's effort to counter abortion clinic violence, see, for example, Joyce Gemperlein,
NOW: Reagan Fueling Anti-Abortion Attacks, PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 16, 1984, at A4. On the politics of
the ERA in the 1980s, see Serena Mayeri, A New E.R.A. or a New Era?: Amendment Advocacy and the
Reconstitution ofFeminism, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 1223, 1230-40 (2009).
120 [Vol. 28:103
Reproducing Rights
reproductive liberty. With the election of Eleanor Smeal as NOW President, the
organization played down reliance on litigation and lobbying, reinvigorating
the grassroots protests that had fueled the women's movement in the 1960s and
1970s."
However, throughout the mid-1980s, under Smeal and her successor,
Molly Yard, NOW mostly embraced the vision of rights set forth by the larger
pro-choice coalition. During the ultimately failed nomination of Robert Bork to
the Supreme Court, NOW leaders played a supporting role in the Block Bork
Coalition, a progressive, cross-movement alliance that successfully discredited
Reagan's nominee. With the Court seemingly prepared to overrule Roe, NOW
echoed NARAL's claims that politics could protect rights that the judiciary had
abandoned.97 As a NOW letter to members stated: "Attorneys believe that the
cause of legal abortion must be taken to the people-that the people speaking
with one loud voice is our best hope to protect this essential constitutional
right." 98
By the late 1980s, with the rise of Operation Rescue, NOW leaders began
expressing frustration with politically centered rights. Antiabortion picketers
had mobilized outside of clinics since the 1970s, but by the late 1980s, led by
Binghamton, New York, native Randall Terry, protests expanded
dramatically." Together with a spike in antiabortion violence, the new
blockades reinvigorated the pro-life movement, drawing in new members and
attracting unprecedented media attention.100 In the summer of 1988, an Atlanta,
Georgia blockade of abortion clinics led to hundreds of arrests, flooding the
courts.1os Operation Rescue framed these blockades as "rescues," supposedly
95. See, e.g., Beverly Beyette, NOW Election Means New Activist Course: ERA, Abortion Will Be
at Center of Fresh Approach, L.A. TIMES (July 22, 1985), http://articles.latimes.com/1985-07-
22/news/vw-6203_I _era-campaign; Betty Cuniberti, NOW Chief Has Ambitious Plans in "Comeback"
Bid, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1985, at A18.
96. On NOW's opposition to the Bork nomination, see, for example, Groups Hope to Block Bork,
MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 16, 1987, at 1; New NOW ChiefRips Bork, CHI. SUN TIMES, July 20, 1987, at 22;
and Lorena Oropeza, We Must Block Bork, NOW Members Decide, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 10, 1987,
at B2. On the effort to derail Bork's nomination, see Stephen L. Carter, Bork Redux, or How the
Tempting ofAmerica Led the People to Rise and Battle for Justice, 69 TEX. L. REV. 759, 761 (1991).
97. See Mary Ziegler, Ways to Change: A Reevaluation of Article V Campaigns and Legislative
Constitutionalism, 2009 BYU L. REV. 969, 1002 (discussing NOW's role in the effort to define political
support as a reason to uphold Roe).
98. Letter from NOW to Chapter Presidents (Dec. 5, 1988) (on file with Harvard University,
Schlesinger Library, The NOW Papers, Box 91, Folder 24); see also Memorandum from Pam Hughes to
NOW Officers, Re: Reproductive Rights Media Strategy Group (Dec. 15, 1989) (on file with Harvard
University, Schlesinger Library, The NOW Papers, Box 91, Folder 15).
99. See, e.g., ZIAD W. MUNSON, THE MAKING OF PRO-LIFE ACTIVISTS: How SOCIAL MOVEMENT
MOBILIZATION WORKS 88-89 (2008); JAMES RISEN & JUDY L. THOMAS, WRATH OF ANGELS: THE
AMERICAN ABORTION WAR 181-82, 258-61 (1998); DANIEL K. WILLIAMS, GOD'S OWN PARTY: THE
MAKING OF THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT 223-24 (2010).
100. On the history of Operation Rescue and rise of clinic blockades, see, for example, HALE, supra
note 11, at 277-83; WUTHNOW, supra note I1, at 287-311; and Ginsburg, supra note 11, at 227-50.
101. See, e.g., Ronald Smothers, Atlanta Protests Prove Magnet For Abortion Foes, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 13, 1988), http://www.nytimes.com/1988/08/13/us/atlanta-protests-prove-magnet-for-abortion-
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saving women and children by preventing women from entering a clinic on that
day and perhaps dissuading them from terminating a pregnancy altogether.102
With new blockades announced, NOW members joined with other pro-choice
advocates to debate how best to defuse the threat posed by Operation
Rescue.103
At a May 1989 strategy meeting, members of NOW, NARAL, Planned
Parenthood, and other prominent organizations hared ideas about how to "seek
injunctions [and] videotape protests [to] identify specific protestors."'04
Blockades almost inevitably involved breaking local trespassing laws.105
Pursuing trespass charges, the argument went, would create crushing financial
burdens that would put at least some blockaders out of business.'06
While using the courts, advocates also wanted to present blockaders as
enemies of both the Constitution and the rule of law. Framing members of the
opposition as outlaws promised to swing public opinion. Meeting participants
planned to step up "'negative' advertising, defining the opposition as
extremists."'07 Operation Rescue leaders described blockades as acts of
conscientious objection.1os By invoking conventional understandings of the
Constitution, movement leaders responded that rescues were illegal, anarchic,
and contrary to the nation's principles. The meeting advised those present not
to "define Operation Rescue's activities as civil disobedience," since doing so
"defines them as part of the civil rights movement.' 109 Instead "[s]ince the
majority of the Operation Rescue leadership [were] men," meeting attendees
decided to "project the image of men trying to prevent women from exercising
their rights.""o Defeating Operation Rescue would require movement leaders
to "mobilize [coalition partners] to speak out against lawlessness.""'I
However, given NOW's investment in grassroots protest, the rise of
Operation Rescue offered more complex lessons. Although critical of the way
clinic blockaders conducted direct-action protest, NOW leaders learned from
the apparent efficacy of antiabortion acts of civil disobedience. Feminists
recognized that blockades had drawn unprecedented media ttention, but the
foes.html; David Treadwell, Escalating Protests Turn Atlanta Into a Battleground, L.A. TIMES (Aug.
13, 1988), http://articles.latimes.com/1988-08-13/news/mn-168_ 1abortion-clinics.
102. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note I1, at 232; Susan Faludi, Where Did Randy Go Wrong?,
MOTHER JONES, Nov. 1989, at 24; Peg Tyre, Holy War: On the Abortion Front Lines with Operation
Rescue, N.Y. MAG., Apr. 24, 1989, at 48.
103. See, e.g., Operation Rescue Strategy Meeting Minutes (May 15, 1989) (on file with Duke












return of civil disobedience to the news also reminded NOW leaders of the
power of street protests in the lead-up to Roe. The organization's members
grew disillusioned with NARAL's approach to abortion rights, believing that
politicians and voters would inevitably compromise on key issues and
disappoint the American women who depended on them. Instead, NOW leaders
insisted that women and abortion providers could best enforce abortion rights
by refusing to obey unjust laws and guaranteeing themselves that women could
still terminate pregnancies. To be sure, if the Court overruled Roe, NOW
members planned protests large enough to match clinic blockades. However,
the organization's leaders also urged providers to continue offering abortion
services, regardless of what the Supreme Court held.l12 Women and providers
who continued exercising abortion rights were the ones who could enforce
abortion rights.
In December 1988, when the Court seemed ready to overrule Roe, NOW
activists questioned the value of defending rights politically. ''3 A letter to
group members proposed that feminists could defend abortion rights not by
trusting politicians or judges but by acting as if an adverse court decision did
not matter.14 As the letter explained: "Should abortion become illegal there
will be wholesale disregard of the law."'15 If the Justices reversed Roe, women
and providers would continue to exercise their rights as if nothing had changed.
B. NOW Members Develop Their Own Idea of Rights
Conflict with Operation Rescue pushed NOW members to elaborate on the
relationship between direct action protest and constitutional rights. In early
1989, members of the NOW Board of Directors questioned the wisdom of a
strategy that depended on politically motivated judges and legislators to enforce
rights. As board member Eleanor Smeal explained, going to court
empowered radical pro-lifers who wanted to "look like martyrs, especially if
they can claim that the police are abusive."' "7 If politicians had proved to be the
last people deserving of trust, board members argued, feminists could count
only on themselves. Smeal outlined a new strategy, one in which activists could
change the situation outside of clinics. At a minimum, grassroots protests
would change the media image of blockades, ensuring that pro-lifers could not
"have the confrontation with the bully police that they want.""8 Smeal's
112. See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
113. See, e.g., Letter from NOW to Chapter Presidents, supra note 98, at 1.
114. See id.
115. Id.
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proposal gave rise to Project Stand Up for Women, an effort to meet and push
back blockaders who swarmed clinics.119
By July 1989, direct action protest came to seem something more than a
way of countering bad press. Efforts to forestall an adverse decision in Webster
came up short, infuriating members of NOW's radical wing.120 Smeal, a board
member and leader of the Feminist Majority Fund, asked delegates: "Is the
game winning just one lousy seat or is the game changing the politics of this
country7"l2 1 A Florida representative insisted that even working with
sympathetic Democrats was a "serious waste of time." 22 Frustrated NOW
leaders explored alternative solutions, including the formation of an entirely
new political party. As NOW President Molly Yard asserted, "We're sick and
tired of begging." 23
NOW members, like those in NARAL, still believed that the right
politicians and voters might reliably protect constitutional rights. However,
NOW leaders sometimes worried that NARAL's political strategy would not be
enough. In July 1991, Patricia Ireland, a Miami lawyer and the long-time vice
president of the organization, replaced Yard as the group's leader.124 With
Ireland at the helm and the fate of Roe uncertain, NOW leaders united with
other movement members seeking to use the threat to legal abortion to build
momentum during the 1992 election season.125 Privately, however, NOW
leaders began working on an alternative approach to defining and enforcing
rights. Instead of exclusively relying on politicians, as NOW members argued,
feminists should borrow from the civil disobedience that had brought Operation
Rescue into the spotlight.126 In September 1991, anticipating an adverse ruling
in Casey, NOW planned a conference on non-violent civil disobedience,
exploring how women and providers could enforce their own rights. 12 Board
members first worked to distinguish the civil disobedience they imagined from
the activities of blockaders the movement had long labeled outlaws.12 8 NOW
leaders set forth a different idea of civil disobedience, one involving "actions of
119. See id.
120. See, e.g., Dan Balz, Far-Reaching Action Urged at NOW Meeting, WASH. POST, July 23,
1989; NOW Eyes New Party with Clout, USA TODAY, July 24, 1989, at IA; Women's Party Pushed,
CHI. SUN TIMES, July 23, 1989, at 14.
121. Balz, supra note 120.
122. Women's Party Pushed, supra note 120 at 14.
123. NOW Eyes New Party with Clout, supra note 120 at IA.
124. See, e.g., Ireland Becomes President of NOW, Bos. GLOBE, Dec. 16, 1991, at 9; Evelyn
Nieves, With Rising Voice, Acting Head of Feminist Group Assumes Mantle, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 1991,
at 110.
125. On pro-choice rallies in the lead-up to Casey, see, for example, Marchingfor Abortion Rights,
MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 6, 1992, at IA; and Elizabeth Neuffer, 500,000 March for Choice, Bos. GLOBE,
Apr. 6, 1992, at 1.
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protest that don't result in arrest, . . . open . . . plans versus the element of
surprise, [and] various concepts of non-violence."129
In seeking to create a unique approach to civil disobedience, members of
the group also described a different approach to enforcing rights. First,
members reiterated the problems with relying on the courts or the political
branches to enforce rights.130 What mattered was what providers did and what
women demanded. Even before the Supreme Court intervened, the movement
could lose everything, because many "doctors [were not] performing abortions;
those who are talk about getting out of the business."'3 '
In 1992, with a decision looming in Casey, NOW members discussed more
intently how feminists could enforce rights for themselves. Pro-life lawyers
were uncertain about how the Court would resolve Casey, either overruling
Roe, leaving the status quo in place, or settling on something in between, such
as the adoption of a less-protective undue-burden test. Given that the overruling
of Roe seemed to be a realistic possibility, pro-life activists like Denise Neary,
a leading figure in the effort to pass the law challenged in Casey, spoke openly
about the chances of getting states to ban abortion altogether. "If abortionis
outlawed in this country, there will beabortions," she told the Washington Post,
admitting that back-alley procedures would still occur.' 32 "Abortionhas always
been with us. But that doesn't make it right."' 33NARAL predicted that at least
thirteen states would ban abortions if the Court overruled Roe. 134 With the
issues in Casey unresolved, NOW leaders considered how to define or protect
abortion rights in the event that the courts no longer protected them.
At the time, NOW's membership had reached 250,000, and the
organization's prominent opposition to President George H.W. Bush's
nomination of Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court had driven up both
recruiting and fundraising.'35 In spite of changes to the organization, board
members easily reached a solution about how to respond to the potential
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Dialogue about non-violent civil disobedience gave rise to an alternative
idea of the value of rights enforcement. One board member compared abortion-
rights supporters to the civil rights movement, explaining: "they were
successful because the blacks broke laws that spoke directly to the
unavailability of their rights, and we should do the same."'37 Without
grassroots action, rights would remain abstract, and the public would
understand neither what they were nor why they mattered. Civil disobedience
would bring these abstractions to life, making a moral case for the liberties
women demanded.138
At the same time, as the board argued, non-violent civil disobedience
revealed that lay citizens, not lawmakers, bore the responsibility for enforcing
their own rights. The board outlined a number of strategies for delivering
abortion services, all of them "show[ing] how easy it is to provide healthcare
for women."'39 NOW members planned to hold strikes, to block the path of
police officers arresting providers, and to pour coat hangers on the steps of the
Supreme Court.140 Some of these actions served conventional ends, such as
"forc[ing] media coverage through the November election" and potentially
making a difference in crucial races.141 However, for NOW, non-violent civil
disobedience rested on a more radical idea: social movements gained rights for
their members not by turning to the courts but by enforcing those rights on the
streets. After Casey, the board vowed to create nothing less than "an
underground railroad to provide abortion." 42
New political opportunities and challenges led NOW leaders to set aside
this new idea of rights. Casey did not overrule Roe, eliminating any urgent need
for civil disobedience or the creation of an underground abortion network.143
Bill Clinton, a supporter of abortion rights, won the 1992 presidential race, and
a pro-choice majority took power in Congress.
Believing that more comprehensive protections were possible, NOW
leaders initially focused on opposing the Freedom of Choice Act unless it
eliminated exceptions involving abortion funding and parental consultation.145
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mutiny led by feminists angry about the organization's emphasis on the
abortion issue at the expense of equally important policy questions.146 In 1993,
in the lead-up to that year's board elections, a group of four mounted a
challenge for the leadership of the organization, citing "growing frustration
within the membership."4 7 The leader of the dissidents, Efia Nwangaza,
insisted that NOW had let go of other priorities in fixating on abortion.14 8
Nwangaza and her allies argued that the organization's leadership remained
predominantly white and middle class.14 9 As a result, Nwangaza insisted that
NOW had treated abortion as a stand-alone issue instead of positioning it as
just one part of a broader healthcare agenda.150 "Abortionis but one aspect of a
larger issue," she explained at a news conference on the issue.is5
Although maintaining power, Patricia Ireland and her colleagues moved to
demonstrate their accomplishments, seizing more realistic political
opportunities and countering the efforts of clinic blockaders.152 However,
Nwangaza's push for a broader reproductive-health agenda had a more lasting
influence.'53 Later, NOW would endorse calls for reproductive justice rather
than reproductive rights, focusing more on the concerns of poor women and
women of color.154
However, the concerns about rights dependent on lawmakers did not easily
fade away. In the mid-1990s, worried about a changing health care landscape, a
shrinking provider population, and the campaign to ban dilation and extraction
abortion, clinic workers organized a new challenge to the movement's reliance
on rights discourse and constitutional law, presenting both as a hindrance to
any true movement for reproductive justice.
Ill. MOVEMENT DISSENTERS REDEFINE RIGHTS DISCOURSE AS AN OBSTACLE
By the mid-1990s, mobilized providers set out to create a new
reproductive-health politics, one largely separated from the idea of rights.
Working in the National Coalition of Abortion Providers (NCAP), these
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activists spotlighted the costs of rights rhetoric and a focus on constitutional
law. By investing so much in keeping abortion legal, NCAP argued, the
movement had put certain arguments off limits, fueling opposition accusations
of dishonesty and amorality. At the same time, NCAP leaders asserted that by
refusing to tackle hard ethical or emotional questions, the movement had failed
to connect to the Americans who benefited from reproductive health services.
Rather than talking about or defending rights, NCAP wanted to explain the
moral value of legal abortion. This Part begins by studying the roots of the
providers' movement in pro-choice organizing. With this foundation in place, it
turns next to the context of NCAP's protests in the early 1990s. Finally, this
Part examines why NCAP's challenge to a rights-centered strategy fell short.
A. A Movement for Providers Organizes
Resistance to the movement's emphasis on rights began in an established
movement of clinic workers. The providers' movement took shape in the late
1970s in the face of a rapidly changing health care landscape. In the late 1970s,
when the federal government and many states banned the use of public dollars
or facilities for abortion, abortion care moved from hospitals to freestanding
clinics.'55  According to a 1982 study published in Family Planning
Perspectives, the percentage of hospital procedures decreased from fifty-two
percent in 1973 to twenty-two percent in 1980.15 With Medicaid funding
unavailable, fewer hospitals offered the procedure, and with improvements in
obstetrical and gynecological care, independent clinics could more easily offer
abortions at a low cost.157 With many clinics specializing in reproductive health
services, providers encountered political hostility and legal threats other health
care professionals often avoided.
Formed in 1977, the National Abortion Federation (NAF) organized to set
guidelines for abortion care and to encourage providers to mobilize.1 The
organization, already representing over 160 facilities by 1979, formed a
legislative action committee and vowed to "assume a more aggressive
155. On the impact of the Medicaid cutoff on abortion services, see, for example, Stanley K.
Henshaw & Lynn S. Wallisch, The Medicaid Cutoff and Abortion Services for the Poor, 16 FAM. PLAN.
PERSP. 170, 170-80 (1984).
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posture."l59 From the outset, NAF had a large, diverse membership that
included independent abortion providers, Planned Parenthood clinic operators,
businessmen seeking to enter a new reproductive health service, physicians,
and political activists concerned about the legal status of abortion rights.'60
NAF members held varying views about the ideal model for delivering abortion
services: while feminists who operated women's health clinics viewed
healthcare delivery as a matter of sex equality, some of NAF's physician
members argued for a more traditional, medical approach to abortion care.161
Although the diversity of NAF members sparked a rich and productive
discussion about how best to approach abortion care, the cracks in the
organization were visible from the beginning.'62
Concern about the value of rights rhetoric emerged first in the feminist
wing of the providers' movement, a group originally committed to defining
abortion as more than a simple medical service.6 3 After the Supreme Court
decided Roe, new feminist health centers opened their doors. Leaders of these
clinics saw feminism as a priority.16
Feminist perspective on the shortcomings of rights discourse connected to
a longstanding critique of the mainstream medical system-one that divided the
provider community.165 Feminist women's health activists wanted to expose
and remedy problems with the medical establishment, including the side effects
of oral contraceptives, a lack of informed consent, the risks associated with the
Dalkon Shield, and the cancer cases connected to diethylstilbestrol (DES), a
drug designed to prevent miscarriages.166 While feminist activists charged
medical professionals with indifference to women's needs and experiences,
established doctors worried that feminist counselors lacked the qualifications to
159. Nadine Brozan, Abortion Rights in Peril, Say Advocates at Conference, N.Y. TIMES, July 20,
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advise patients.167 As Warren H. Pearse, the executive director of the American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, explained in 1980, "While we'd
like women to know their own bodies, our biggest concern is the sense of false
assurance from an untrained care giver."' 68
The fault line in the provider community widened in the late 1980s, when
feminists questioned not only the wisdom of mainstream practitioners'
approach to medical care but also the political, rights-based strategy NAF
deployed. Conflict with NAF came to the surface during debates within the
organization's Feminist Caucus, a group that brought together feminist
providers and advocates from organizations like NOW and the 80% Majority, a
pro-choice political action group.169 In April 1989, with Webster looming,
caucus members took issue with the tactics on which mainstream pro-choice
advocates relied.170 Some complained that providers made as little as $20,000 a
year while pro-choice lobbyists "fund-rais[ed] off [their] backs."171
This led some members to question the wisdom of the strategy pursued by
NOW and its allies. Caucus member Charlotte Taft asked why providers were
not a "political force" when so many women needed reproductive health
services.172 For Taft and her colleagues, the question mattered in a world where
neither the courts nor the political branches reliably supported legal abortion.
"We need to face up and stop denying our situation," she insisted. "Let's
pretend Roe v. Wade is gone. Some people need to explore alternative
routes."'7 3 Patricia Ireland of NOW countered that the movement should focus
on preserving existing rights, stating that it would be "dangerous to let it be
known to politicians and the media that we have given up on Roe."l74 Ireland
failed to reassure caucus members worried about existing strategic approaches.
Caucus member Peg Johnston spoke up for those convinced that the movement
needed to "find [its] own positive energy, not react to the [opposition]." 75
Spurred on by their dissatisfaction with NAF, Johnston and Taft would later
play an important role in organizing providers, helping to found both NCAP
and the November Gang, a group that developed new counseling strategies and
167. On tensions between feminist women's health activists and the medical establishment, see
Wendy Kline, The Making of Our Bodies, Ourselves: Rethinking Women's Health and Second- Wave
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pushed for a voice for providers in Washington, D.C.17 6 Dissatisfaction with
NAF ultimately led providers to form a new, more overtly political
organization, one that questioned the strategies used by NARAL and NOW. 7 1
B. Providers Question the Wisdom ofa Rights-Centered Strategy
After Webster came down, providers' worries about a rights-centered
strategy came to a crisis, prompting activists like Taft and Johnston to form an
organization for independent clinic leaders who felt "isolated and unsure of
what to do next." 78 Those providers and directors formed the November Gang,
a provider group, not only to offer support to struggling clinic workers but also
to create a place where activists could exchange ideas about the future of the
movement.179 Members envisioned a national organization that would educate
the public about what providers did. At first, some resisted the idea of forming
a new organization, asking NAF leaders to change the organization's agenda.
As Peg Johnston, a member of the November Gang, wrote to Nicki Nichols
Gamble of NAF: "[T]he public must understand that . . .we are not profiteers;
that we are under siege by anti-choice fanatics . . . , that we are responsible for
many innovations in healthcare delivery such as informed consent . . . ",8 0
In spite of Johnston's efforts to change NAF from within, the push for a
new organization continued. Johnston and her colleagues contacted Ron
Fitzsimmons, a former NARAL lobbyist, to change the conversation about
reproductive health in Congress. In setting forth the plan for the National
Coalition of Abortion Providers (NCAP), Fitzsimmons described some of the
flaws built into a rights-centered strategy.182 During testimony on FOCA, as
Fitzsimmons reported, abortion opponents "spent their time painting a
gruesome picture of how the 'cold, calculating' clinic operators take advantage
of women."'83 By showcasing what women had the power to do, pro-choice
witnesses and politicians could not "set the record straight about what actually
goes on in a clinic." 84 For many providers, a rights-centered strategy had fallen
sadly short. As Fitzsimmons explained, providers had to steer dialogue away
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from constitutional abstractions, "'com[ing] out of the closet" and "educating
the public about the services . . . they provide women."185 Fitzsimmons
suggested that rights rhetoric left little room for discussion of the services
providers offered to women and the supportive environment that many clinics
tried to create.'86
At first, after its founding in 1990, NCAP mostly tackled issues
deemphasized by established organizations without directly critiquing the work
of groups like NARAL or Planned Parenthood. Independent providers asked
for support in marketing, opening new clinics, and managing malpractice
insurance.'8 7 Clinic directors also exchanged ideas about how to compete with
Planned Parenthood or to convince health maintenance organizations (HMOs)
to contract with independent clinics.'88
In 1991, NCAP took on the issue of "phony clinics," targeting crisis
pregnancy centers that held themselves out as abortion clinics but in reality
offered pro-life counseling. 89 While NCAP fell short of securing legislation on
the subject, the organization reached an agreement with the Association of
Directory Publishers, a consortium of phonebook publishers, to list pregnancy
crisis centers separately from abortion clinics.' 90 As early as 1991, NCAP
helped to get the issue of clinic protection on the national agenda when
Representatives Mel Levine (D-Cal.) and Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.) sponsored
a federal law making it a crime to block access to clinics. 91 Because of these
successes, the organization grew rapidly, expanding from a handful of clinics in
1990 to over 150 members in 1993.192
In 1992, the Casey decision pushed NCAP members to move beyond
filling gaps in the agenda of mainstream groups. Planning to use an adverse
outcome to elect a pro-choice president and Congress, groups like NARAL
framed Casey as a bitter defeat. For example, Kelli Conlon, a NARAL
spokesperson, told the media: "We think American women lost the right to
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choose today."'93 Mainstream organizations' response to Casey worried
providers dealing with confused and anxious patients. Fitzsimmons
summarized members' concerns as follows: "There is a concern that, because
of the heightened rhetoric (some of it politically necessary), many women
might think that abortion is illegal." 94 Fitzsimmons explained that while
political activists had reason to play up the threat to legal abortion, providers
had to convince women that reproductive-health care was still accessible and
did not violate any criminal law.' 95
While reassuring patients, members also contended that a rights-centered
message fueled opposition allegations about providers.196 Rights rhetoric put
center stage the boundary between state power and individual liberty. By
extension, in defending rights, activists denounced legal restrictions that cut
away at women's freedom. For providers, such criticism sometimes reinforced
public discomfort with providers and their work. "While the Supreme Court
said restrictions could be imposed on the provision of abortion services, the fact
is most abortion providers already impose their own 'restrictions,"'
Fitzsimmons wrote his members.'97 NCAP members set out to educate
policymakers and members of the public about the fact "that clinics have
'waiting periods,' that abortion providers invented 'informed consent'
provisions and that clinics encourage (and some require) parental/adult
involvement."'9 8
In the winter after the decision of Casey, NCAP members began
formulating a message no longer centered on the Constitution. The organization
first experimented with a new rhetorical approach in a press release about fetal
killing.1 99 Since 1973, mainstream pro-choice groups had mostly dodged the
subject, emphasizing that religious, legal, medical, and ethical authorities could
not reach a consensus on when life began.20o NCAP members suggested that
downplaying fetal killing patronized women and allowed abortion opponents to
claim the moral high ground. "[E]very woman who enters our clinics knows
what she is doing when she decides to terminate a pregnancy," the press release
asserted.201 "She knows that if she does not terminate the pregnancy, she will
give birth to a baby. That is what makes the abortion decision so difficult for
most women."202 Instead of describing what women had the liberty to do,
193. Sara Fritz, The Abortion Decision, L.A. TIMES, June 30, 1992.
194. Letter from Ron Fitzsimmons to NCAP Members (July 30, 1992) (on file with Duke





199. See Press Release, NCAP, Is Abortion Murder? (Nov. 17, 1992) (on file with Duke
University, Bingham Library, The NCAP Papers, Box 1, Folder 1).
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NCAP argued that the emotional complexity of abortion explained why the
government should allow women to make their own decisions.203 It was
because of, not in spite of, the moral stakes of abortion that the procedure
mattered so much. The press release stated: "No one can understand what a
woman goes through at this time of her life. That is why the decision must
ultimately be left to the woman."204
During the mid-1990s, NCAP members built on the fetal-killing release,
highlighting the difference between secure abortion rights and meaningful
access to abortion. "While the right to obtain an abortion appears relatively
safe," Fitzsimmons stated, "that right may soon be meaningless if the number
of physicians performing abortions continues to decrease at the current
alarming rate."205 Instead of laws codifying rights, NCAP prioritized legislation
on access to clinics and security for providers. In 1993, after the murder of
member Dr. David Gunn, the organization mobilized support for the Freedom
206
of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE). Fitzsimmons went so far as
telling the press that recruiting providers with the ability to perform the
procedure was "not just a problem, it's the problem."207
C. In the Middle of the Partial-Birth Abortion Wars, NCAP Proposes an
Alternative Approach
By 1997, with the abortion battle focused on the dilation and extraction
procedure (D&X), popularly known as partial-birth abortion, NCAP wanted to
transform what many viewed as a devastating setback for the pro-choice
movement into an opportunity to change movement rhetoric.208
By the mid-1990s, the D&X debate had redefined dialogue about abortion.
In 1995, Ohio became the first state to ban elective D&X.209 By September
203. See id.
204. Id.
205. Memorandum from Ron Fitzsimmons to NCAP Members, Our Message 2 (Dec. 3, 1992) (on
file with Duke University, Bingham Library, The NCAP Papers, Box 1, Folder 1); see also Abortion
Providers' Day on Capitol Hill (Oct. 27, 1993) (on file with Duke University, Bingham Library, The
NCAP Papers, Box 1, Folder 1).
206. On NCAP's push for clinic-protective legislation, see Memorandum from National Coalition
of Abortion Providers, Physicians Seek Federal Protection (Oct. 27, 1993) (on file with Duke
University, Bingham Library, The NCAP Papers, Box 1, Folder 1); and Congress Holds Oversight
Hearings on FACE (Sept. 19, 1994) (on file with Duke University, Bingham Library, The NCAP
Papers, Box 1, Folder 1, Bingham Library).
207. Boodman, supra note 192.
208. For more on the partial-birth abortion campaign, see, for example, Reva B. Siegel, The Right's
Reasons: Constitutional Conflict and the Spread of Woman-Protective Antiabortion Argument, 57 DUKE
L.J. 1641 (2008); and Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions
Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1706-35 (2008).
209. On the Ohio ban, see, for example, Ohio Becomes First to Outlaw "Dilation" Abortions,
MEM.COM. APPEAL, Aug. 18, 1995, at Al l; and State to Fight for Late Term Abortion Law Despite
Ruling, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Dec. 15, 1995, at 5C.
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1996, Congress had introduced a ban at the federal level.2 oAfter President Bill
Clinton vetoed the law, Democrats in Congress simply proposed a narrow ban
of their own.211 Even NARAL leader Kate Michelman seemed ready to accept
a bill including exceptions for the woman's health and fetal defects.212
How could pro-choice leaders win a losing issue? Planned Parenthood
leaders insisted that constitutional liberty remained the primary issue, while
D&X remained "extremely rare and done only in cases when the woman's life
is in danger or in cases of extreme fetal abnormality."2 13 NAF released statistics
suggesting that providers primarily used D&X in the second trimester, ending
wanted pregnancies only after a woman learned of a risk to herself or to her
214child. More significantly, NARAL and other groups described the bill as a
direct attack on constitutional liberty. Michelman agreed that the "bill . . .
would devastate Roe v. Wade and the freedom to choose."2 15
In responding to the new challenge of D&X bans, mainstream groups like
NARAL, Planned Parenthood, and NOW still largely treated rights as a part of
ordinary politics, emphasizing strategies that would maximize public support
for the procedure. At a tactical symposium hosted by Planned Parenthood in the
middle of the partial-birth abortion wars, some attendees echoed NCAP's
concerns that the movement fed into opposition efforts to stigmatize the
procedure.216 In particular, by talking about choice in abstract terms, as some
activists claimed, the movement made abortion "a dirty word that [. . .] can't be
said."2 17
However, most at the meeting expressed the opposite concern, maintaining
that the movement had not done enough to convince sexually conservative
Americans.2 18 "[W]hat we stand for," as one attendee explained, "is not
everybody-doing-it-when-they-want-to-do-it-with-whom-they-want-to-do-it-
210. See, e.g., David Espo, Late-Term Abortion Ban Passes Congress, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Mar.
28, 1996, at Al.
211. For discussion of the Clinton veto, see, for example, Alison Mitchell, Clinton, in Emotional
Terms, Explains His Abortion Veto, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 1996),
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/12/14/us/clinton-in-emotional-terms-explains-his-abortion-veto.html; and
Clinton's Foes Keep Focus on His Veto of Late-Term Abortion Ban, DALL. MORNING NEWS, May 28,
1996, at 7A.
212. See, e.g., Melissa Healy, Senate Votes to Sustain Veto ofLate-Term Abortion Ban, L.A. TIMES
(Sept. 27, 1996), http://articles.latimes.com/1 996-09-27/news/mn-48172 1 late-term-abortion-
procedure; Joan Lowy, Dems Try to Ban Late Abortion, CIN. POST, Nov. 27, 1996, at Al; Jill Zuckman,
Daschle Urges Compromise on Late Term Abortion Bill, BOS. GLOBE, Nov. 27, 1996, at A 11.
213. Bill Straub, "Scissors "Abortion Stirs Fight, CIN. POST, Sept. 18, 1996, at IA.
214. See, e.g., id.; see also Carol Byrne, The Right Over Partial Birth Abortion Is Fraught with
Emotion, Politics, and Questions, STAR TRIB., Feb. 9, 1997, at IA; David Waters, Late Term Abortion
Technique Heats Up Debate, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Sept. 19, 1996, at 14A.
215. Ann Devroy, Late Term Abortion Ban Vetoed, WASH. POST (Apr. I1, 1996),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1996/04/1 1/late-term-abortion-ban-vetoed/857678df-
deea-40b8-9abe-dId5ee4f0alc.
216. See Planned Parenthood, Roe v. Wade at 25: A Symposium 46-47 (n.d., c. 1998) (on file with
Duke University, Bingham Library, The Takey Crist Papers, Box 27, Planned Parenthood Folder).
217. Id.
218. See id.
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all-the-time. In the aftermath of the strategy session, Planned Parenthood
developed a campaign, Responsible Choices, intended to highlight "informed,
responsible decisions about sex, relationships, and reproduction."2 20
Like Planned Parenthood, NARAL deemphasized not only D&X but the
abortion procedure as a whole. In 1994, the organization circulated Promoting
Reproductive Choices, a document setting forth a multi-issue agenda and a
message centered on personal responsibility for reproductive decision-
221making. in exercising their reproductive freedom, women and men must
consider the impact their decisions have on their partners, families, and
communities," NARAL argued in 1994.222 "The role of government is to
enable individuals to take responsibility for their decisions."223
Later in the partial-birth abortion battle, the NARAL Foundation developed
Choice for America, a campaign still emphasizing women's "responsible,
deliberate" sexual and reproductive decisions.224 Choice for America also
showcased constitutional arguments, asserting: "The freedom to choose is a
central, fundamental American value-as integral to our way of life as the
freedom to worship."225 A coalition of advocates gathered to strategize about
D&X adopted a similar message in 1996, concluding that advocates hould try
to "keep debate focused on the individual right to choose, not the details of the
procedure."226
However, for NCAP members, the movement's D&X strategy brought to
light larger problems with a strategy centered on the Constitution. On the pro-
life side, American Victims of Abortion and other groups publicizing the
supposed dangers of post-abortion trauma drew unprecedented attention to
women's emotional response to abortion.2 27 Like other pro-choice advocates,
219. Id.
220. Planned Parenthood, Responsible Choices Action Agenda (1997-1998) (on file with Duke
University, Bingham Library, The Takey Crist Papers, Box 27, Planned Parenthood Folder). For more
on Planned Parenthood's strategy in the period, see Planned Parenthood Explores Religious Grounds
for Choice, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 6, 1998, at C2; Planned Parenthood Takes New Aim at
Teen Pregnancy, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Feb. 5, 1997, at 4B; and Steve Proffitt, Interview with Gloria
Feldt: Advocate for Abortion Rights Wins Hearts and Minds, But Not the War, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 13,
1998, at 3.
221. See NARAL, Promoting Reproductive Choices, at vi (n.d., c. 1994) (on file with Duke
University, Bingham Library, The Robin Chandler Duke Papers, Box 2, NARAL 25th Anniversary
Folder).
222. Id.
223. Id.; See generally Kate Michelman, The Moral Choice: Elevate Parenting, L.A. TIMES, Aug.
11, 1996, at M5.
224. NARAL Foundation, Choice for America (n.d., c. 1999) (on file with Duke University
Bingham Library, The Robin Chandler Duke Papers, Box 2, NARAL Miscellaneous Folder).
225. Id. For more on Choice, see VICKI RUTLEDGE SHIELDS, How ADVERTISING AFFECTS SELF-
IMAGE 168 (2002).
226. Katherine Q. Seelye, Abortion-Rights Backers Defend Stance on Late Term Abortion
Procedure, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1997, at A21.
227. On the American Victims of Abortion, see, for example, Janet Cawley, The Stakes Are High,
and So Are the Emotions, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 26, 1989, at 14; Margaret Wolf Freivogel, Abortion
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NCAP members presented Partial Birth Abortion Syndrome (PAS) as a
228
political ploy rather than a scientific reality. At the same time, frustrated by
the tenor of mainstream debate, Fitzsimmons gave an interview on D&X,
admitting that he had "lied" about the number of procedures performed
annually.229 Although regretting framing his previous statements as false,
Fitzsimmons explained that he no longer wanted to apologize for a D&X
procedure that many providers viewed as both necessary for women's health
and morally just.230 In Fitzsimmons's view, his statement stemmed from a
belief, widely shared within the organization, about "the reasons that
[movement members] need to be frank with the public on all aspects of
abortion."231
However, for leaders of mainstream organizations, Fitzsimmons's
admission seemed disastrous, playing into the hands of an opposition that
wanted the public not to think about constitutional rights. "He's suggested
somehow he lied, and we are implicated in his charade," Michelman stated.232
"We don't agree with that."233 Leaders of the Center for Reproductive Law and
,,234
Policy denounced Fitzsimmons for "call[ing] our integrity into question.
By contrast, for some NCAP members, Fitzsimmons's statement created a
valuable opportunity. "The conversation about abortion is not going to
transform because of Planned Parenthood or NAF or any of the groups that are
still holding on to old paradigms," Charlotte Taft wrote her colleagues. 235In
place of an apologetic, rights-centered dialogue, providers could finally tell the
public what they had learned from women who had abortions. Taft saw
Fitzsimmons's statement as an opening for those interested in creating a
message and a reform agenda separate from constitutional rights. She saw great
potential for a movement that could "define and articulate a vision that women
could really relate to (beyond having a right to choose something that they
Strategies Planned, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, July 6, 1989, at IA; Mary Schmich, An Explosive Issue,
CHI. TRIB., July 24, 1989, at 1.
228. See, e.g., NCAP, Partial Birth Abortion Act Update (Apr. 13, 1996) (on file with Duke
University, Bingham Library, The NCAP Papers, Box 1, Folder 1) (arguing that Republicans prioritized
D&X bans as a way to "target the sizable Catholic vote in key swing states").
229. On Fitzsimmons' admission, see, for example, Mona Charen, Editorial, Truth Finally Emerges
About Partial-Birth Abortion, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 2, 1997, at 3B; and Mike Royko,
Editorial, The Lies Behind Late Term Abortions, CLEv. PLAIN DEALER, Mar. 6, 1997, at I 1B.
230. Ron Fitzsimmons, Partial-Birth Abortion Update (Nov. 17, 1997) (on file with Duke
University, Bingham Library, The NCAP Papers, Box 1, Folder 1).
23 1. See id.
232. Seelye, supra note 226, at A21.
233. Id.
234. Letter from Center for Reproductive Law and Policy to NCAP Provider (Feb. 28, 1997) (on
file with Duke University, Bingham Library, The NCAP Papers, Box 1, Ron Fitzsimmons Folder). For
more on the response to Fitzsimmons's statement, see Helen Dewar, Clinton May Ease Stand on
Abortion, WASH. POST, May 14, 1997, at A6; A Look at the New Politics ofAbortion, WASH. POST, June
1, 1997, at C3.
235. E-mail from Charlotte Taft to Ron Fitzsimmons (Jan. 6, 1998) (on file with Duke University,
Bingham Library, The Claire Keyes Papers, Box 1, National Coalition of Abortion Providers Folder).
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actually don't particularly want to have in their lives-an abortion)."236 As she
explained: "Reproductive freedom is a means to a certain quality of life. It is
the QUALITY of life and the experiences of their lives that are important to
women in some ways-not birth control and abortion."237
In the aftermath of the Fitzsimmons controversy, the organization began
creating a defense of legal abortion largely separate from the rights framework
that had dominated discourse for decades. In testifying before Congress, Ren6e
Chelian, the acting president of the organization, explained the importance of
D&X without referring to the Constitution. "I can look my daughter in the eye
and explain that intact D&X abortions are not pretty or easy," she stated.238
"But it just might be the best method to preserve the health, safety, and possibly
the life of the woman."23 9 Chelian suggested that the state could trust women
and providers to decide whether D&X was moral. "Those providers who
perform this highly debated and discussed abortion method have come to terms
with its rather gruesome details," she testified.2 40 "To do so, we stay focused on
the patient-the woman who has come to us for help."241
D. In a Challenging Climate, Mainstream Organizations Resist Change
Ultimately, however, Fitzsimmons's comments strengthened mainstream
groups' commitment to constitutional discourse. In part, NCAP failed to
transform dialogue about abortion because the group already competed-and
sometimes clashed-with organizations that drew on the same sources of
recruits and fundraising dollars. Just the same, the failure of NCAP's imagined
revolution stemmed not just from internal battles but also from larger political,
economic, and social shifts.
With the rise of managed healthcare and a declining abortion rate,
providers' financial struggles only intensified, further dividing a marginalized
community and discouraging activists from pursuing radical solutions. The
shift toward managed healthcare began in the 1970s, as spiraling health care
costs prompted insurers and politicians to explore new options.242 Between
1970 and 1996, healthcare expenditures skyrocketed, reaching $1.04 trillion by
236. E-mail from Charlotte Taft to Ron Fitzsimmons et al. (Dec. 3, 1997) (on file with Duke
University, Bingham Library, The Claire Keyes Papers, Box 1, National Coalition of Abortion Providers
Folder).
237. Id.
238. Partial Birth Abortion: The Truth: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H.




242. For discussion of the spiraling costs of health care and the policy response to growing costs,
see, for example, DAVID DRANOVE, THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN HEALTHCARE: FROM MARCUS
WELBY TO MANAGED CARE 75-89 (2009); and JULIUS RICHMOND & RASHI FEIN, THE HEALTHCARE
MESS: How WE GOT INTO IT AND WHAT IT WILL TAKE To GET OUT 63-69 (2005).
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the mid-1990s.243 To control costs, insurers and physicians began
experimenting with health care management organizations (HMOs) and
preferred provider plans (PPOs), combining insurance and treatment for
244patients in return for a lump sum payment.
Between 1973 and 1990, because of public interest in cost containment,
managed health care expanded dramatically. In 1973, Congress passed the
Healthcare Management Organization Act, requiring employers to offer a
managed healthcare option.245 With the Act in place, the health care landscape
changed quickly: whereas roughly five to ten percent of Americans subscribed
to a managed plan in 1980, over sixty percent had signed up by 1987, and the
numbers continued to climb.24 6 By 1995, over fifty-one million Americans
subscribed to some kind of managed care plan, with the number increasing by
twenty-three percent in 1992 alone.247
Because the rise of HMOs increased existing tensions between providers
already confronting a declining customer base and a difficult political
environment, few activists wanted to take on a more controversial or ambitious
agenda. Because HMOs controlled such a large share of the market, they
enjoyed a substantial bargaining advantage with providers seeking inclusion in
a network.24 8 With a nationwide network of clinics, Planned Parenthood often
found a place in both HMO and PPO networks, making it harder for
independent clinics to convince managed care networks to include them.249
Those independent clinics that did belong to provider networks had to make a
profit in a managed network environment that incentivized health care workers
to cut services, salaries, and costs.250 In an increasingly challenging financial
climate, providers often found themselves in competition for a shrinking
243. See, e.g., The Social Organization of Medical Workers, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF HEALTH AND
ILLNESS: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 231 (Peter Conrad ed., 7th ed. 2005).
244. See, e.g., JAN COOMBS, THE RISE AND FALL OF HMOs: AN AMERICAN HEALTHCARE
REVOLUTION 223-24 (2005); DRANOVE, supra note 242, at 67-71; ROBERT I. FIELD, MOTHER OF
INVENTION: HOW THE GOVERNMENT CREATED "FREE-MARKET" HEALTH CARE 171-73 (2014).
245. See 42 U.S.C. § 300(e).
246. On the rate of HMO subscription, see, for example, Michael Malinowski, Capitation, Changes
in Medical Technology, and the Advent of a New Era in Medical Ethics, 22 AM. J. L. & MED. 331, 360
n.2 (1996).
247. See id.
248. "[Mjanaged care organizations control costs primarily by controlling a network of providers
and guaranteeing them a high volume of patients in return for lower treatment rates." William J. Bahr,
Although Offering More Freedom to Choose, Any Willing Provider Legislation Is the Wrong Choice, 45
U. KAN. L. REV. 457, 582-83 (1997).
249. On the competitive advantage Planned Parenthood enjoyed over independent clinics, see, for
example, MORGEN, supra note 163, at 151.
250. See, e.g., Ralph Jimenez, Abortion Clinics Face Competition, Bos. GLOBE, July 1 1, 1993, at I;
Gina Kolata, As Abortion Rate Decreases, Clinics Compete for Patients, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2000),
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/30/us/as-abortion-rate-decreases-clinics-compete-for-patients.html ;
Abigail Trafford, Op-Ed, Competing for Abortions, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 1995, at E15; cf Brian Liang,
Patient Injury Incentives in Law, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 7-8 (1998) ("In the intensely competitive
market of healthcare delivery, the key to survival is minimizing costs.").
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customer base, making both cooperation and radical strategic change less
viable.251
While a changing system of health care delivery increased internal
movement tensions, political setbacks encouraged activists to consolidate
existing victories. The pro-choice majority activists built up in both houses of
Congress disappeared in the face of what commentators called the Republican
Revolution of 1994.252 Led by Minority Whip Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.),
Republicans in the midterm elections achieved a fifty-two seat swing in the
House, taking control for the first time since 1954.253 Worse for pro-choice
leaders, the election cemented Republican control in the South, with abortion
opponents picking up nineteen seats and outnumbering Democrats in the region
254
for the first time since Reconstruction.
Some of this shift may have reflected the mobilization of conservative
evangelical Protestant voters, one of the groups most vehemently opposed to
abortion.255 Exit polls from the midterm election showed that as many as
twenty-seven percent of voters described themselves as born-again Christians,
an increase of ten percent in the course of a decade.256 At a time when activists
struggled to preserve the status quo, movement members felt they could not
afford a radical transformation of their message and agenda.
251. In 1992, the number of abortions performed in the United States was the lowest recorded since
the Roe decision. See, e.g., Stanley K. Henshaw & Jennifer Van Vort, Abortion Services in the United
States, 1991 to 1992, 26 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 100, 100 (1994). By 1996, the rate had declined again, from
roughly 1.5 million to 1.2 million. See, e.g., Stanley K. Henshaw, Abortion Incidence in the United
States, 1995 to 1996, 30 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 263, 263 (1998).
252. For contemporary perceptions of the Republican Revolution, see, for example, David
Bowermaster, Keeping Score on the GOP Revolution, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 21, 1995, at 35-
36; Edwin Chen, Can Gingrich Hold His Tongue for the Good of the Party?, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1995,
at 1; Godfrey Sperling, The Republican Revolution Rolls On, CHRISTIAN SCL MONITOR, Oct. 31, 1995,
at 19.
253. On Republican successes during the 1994 election, see, for example, SEAN P. CUNNINGHAM,
AMERICAN POLITICS IN THE POSTWAR SUNBELT: CONSERVATIVE GROWTH IN A BATTLEGROUND
REGION 241 (2014); STANLEY B. GREENBERG, MIDDLE CLASS DREAMS: THE POLITICS AND POWER OF
THE NEW AMERICAN MAJORITY 16-19 (1995); Nicol C. Rae & Colton C. Campbell, From Evolution to
Revolution: Congress Under Republican Control, in NEW MAJORITY OR OLD MINORITY? THE IMPACT
OF REPUBLICANS ON CONGRESS 2-4 (1999).
254. On Republican successes in the South, see, for example, EARL BLACK, THE RISE OF
SOUTHERN REPUBLICANS 330 (2009); and James P. Pfiffner, The President and Congress at the Turn of
the Century: Structural Sources of Conflict, in RIVALS FOR POWER: PRESIDENTIAL-CONGRESSIONAL
RELATIONS 28 (James Thurber ed., 2002).
255. On evangelical Protestant opposition to abortion in the 1990s, see, for example, MATTHEW
LEVENDUSKY, THE PARTISAN SORT: How LIBERALS BECAME DEMOCRATS AND CONSERVATIVES
BECAME REPUBLICANS 68 (2009); Clyde Wilcox, Evangelicals and Abortion, in A PUBLIC FAITH:
EVANGELICALS AND CIVIL ENGAGEMENT 101, 112-13 (Michael Cromartie ed., 2003).
256. On evangelical voting in the 1994 election, see, for example, STEVEN P. MILLER, THE AGE OF
EVANGELICISM: AMERICA'S BORN AGAIN YEARS 110 (2014); and Lyman E. Kellstedt et al., Has Godot
Finally Arrived? Religion and Realignment, in RELIGION AND THE CULTURE WARS: DISPATCHES FROM
THE FRONT 291-98 (John Clifford Green ed., 1996).
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E. The Reproductive Justice Framework Reemerges
As Efia Nwangaza's earlier challenge suggested, women of color had long
argued for a reproductive-health agenda broader than the single-focus approach
often taken by organizations like NARAL.257 Beginning in the 1960s and early
1970s, women of color worked to forge a broader agenda, one that included
protection against sterilization abuse and support for women who wanted to
bring a pregnancy to term.258 These efforts intensified after 1994, when a
caucus of African-American women returning from the Cairo Conference on
International Population and Development took inspiration from the
comprehensive vision of reproductive health set forth in international human
rights law.259 The 1994 Cairo Programme of Action had defined reproductive
health as a human right, exposing the gap between pro-choice rhetoric at home
and the bolder agenda promoted abroad.260 At a meeting of the Illinois Pro-
Choice Alliance in Chicago, a group of African-American women coined the
term "reproductive justice" to describe the vision they identified with
international human rights law.261 The idea of reproductive justice wove in
familiar attacks on the idea of choice, noting that poor and often non-white
women lacked the support and resources to control their own reproductive
lives.262 As Loretta Ross has explained, "the isolation of abortion from other
social justice issues that concern all our communities contributes to, rather than
counters, reproductive oppression."263
The idea of reproductive justice reflected the work of established
organizations like the National Black Women's Health Project (founded in
1984) and the National Latina Health Organization (founded in 1986), many of
which raised concerns about a choice-centered framework in the late 1980s and
257. See infra notes 259-260 and accompanying text.
258. See generally JENNIFER NELSON, WOMEN OF COLOR AND THE REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS
MOVEMENT (2003) (tracing the mobilization of women of color around issues of reproductive justice);
JAEL SILLIMAN ET AL., UNDIVIDED RIGHTS: WOMEN OF COLOR ORGANIZE FOR REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE
(2004) (same); RICKIE SOLINGER, PREGNANCY AND POWER: A SHORT HISTORY OF REPRODUCTIVE
POLITICS IN AMERICA (2005) (same).
259. See, e.g., Carole Joffe & Jennifer Reich, The Way Forward: Moving Toward Reproductive
Justice, in REPRODUCTION AND SOCIETY: INTERDISCIPLINARY READINGS 239 (Carole Joffe & Jennifer
Reich eds., 2015); Vdronique Mottier, Reproductive Rights, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF GENDER
AND POLITICS 214 (Georgina Waylen et al. eds., 2013)..
260. See Report of the International Conference on Population and Development, UNITED
NATIONS 117.2 (1995), http://www.ipci20l4.org/sites/ipci2014.org/files/icpd eng.pdf.
261. JESSICA LEANN URBAN, NATION, IMMIGRATION, AND ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY 18-19
(2008). On the effort to connect reproductive justice to international human rights and "bring Cairo
home," see JENNIFER NELSON, MORE THAN MEDICINE: A HISTORY OF THE FEMINIST WOMEN'S
HEALTH MOVEMENT 211 (2015).
262. See, e.g., Loretta Ross, Understanding Reproductive Justice (Nov. 2006),
http://www.trustblackwomen.org/our-work/what-is-reproductive-justice/9-what-is-reproductive-justice
(last visited Apr. 23, 2016); see also SOLINGER, supra note 258, at 248.
263. Ross, supra note 262.
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early 1990s.264 After the mid-1990s, new groups like the SisterSong Women of
Color Reproductive Health Collective formed to champion the idea of
265
reproductive justice. To be sure, the push for reproductive justice in the mid-
1990s bore some fruit. Both NARAL and Planned Parenthood adopted broader
reform agendas, and NOW made welfare rights a priority.266 Just the same, the
mainstream movement's emphasis on a narrow idea of rights remained a
constant throughout the decade.267
After 2010, however, mainstream organizations themselves adopted the
rhetoric and reasoning of reproductive justice. Beginning in 2011, frustrated at
its inability to reach younger women, Planned Parenthood conducted polling
and focus groups that revealed that a choice-centered message did not capture
the range of issues, including health care, insurance coverage, pay equity, and
birth control coverage, motivating many voters.268 In the 2014 election season,
Planned Parenthood responded by setting aside the rhetoric of choice, searching
for arguments that resonated with more women, and opening the door to a more
in-depth discussion of reproductive justice.269
As early as 2004, NOW's national conference featured sessions on
reproductive justice.270 By 2016, the organization invoked reproductive justice
in demanding access not only to abortion but also "birth control, pre-natal care,
maternity leave, child care and other crucial health and family services." As
materials for the organization explained, "NOW affirms that reproductive rights
are issues of life and death for women, not mere matters of choice."272
Scholars have developed a rich theoretical framework to elaborate on the
ideas and experiences of grassroots champions of reproductive justice.273
Defined by the work of legal commentators like Dorothy Roberts and Robin
West and historians like Rickie Solinger, the new theory of reproductive justice
264. E.g., SOLINGER, supra note 258, at 247; URBAN, supra note 261, at 19.
265. See, e.g., SILLIMAN ET AL., supra note 258, at 42; Mottier, supra note 259, at 216.
266. On the expansion of NARAL's agenda beyond abortion in the period, see Charles Babington,
Abortion-Rights Group Broadens Focus, WASH. POST, Dec. 24, 1992, at Al. On Planned Parenthood's
efforts in this vein, see Shari Roan, Moving Beyond Abortion, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1993, at 1.
267. See supra Part 11.
268. See, e.g., Jackie Calmes, Activists Shun 'Pro-Choice' to Expand Message, N.Y. TIMES (July
28, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/29/us/politics/advocates-shun-pro-choice-to-expand-
message.html; Dawn Laguens, We're Fighting for Access, Not Choice, HUFFINGTON POST (July 30,
2014, 7:52 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dawn-laguens/were-fighting-for-
access b 5635999.html.
269. See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
270. See 2004 NOW National Conference Resolutions, NAT'L NOW TIMES, Fall 2004, at 13.
271. See, e.g., Reproductive Justice Is Every Woman's Right, NAT'L ORG. FOR WOMEN (2016),
http://now.org/resource/reproductive-justice-is-every-womans-right.
272. See, e.g., Reproductive Rights and Justice, NAT'L ORG. FOR WOMEN (2016),
http://now.org/issues/abortion-rights-reproductive-issues.
273. See, e.g., NELSON, supra note 258; DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE,
REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY (1997); RICKIE SOLINGER, BEGGARS AND CHOOSERS:
How THE POLITICS OF CHOICE SHAPES ADOPTION, ABORTION, AND WELFARE IN THE UNITED STATES
(2001); Robin West, From Choice to Reproductive Justice: De-Constitutionalizing Abortion Rights, 118
YALE L.J. 1394 (2009).
[Vol. 28:103142
Reproducing Rights
makes a compelling case for a more comprehensive approach to reproductive
health.274
However, as the Article suggests, the success of challenges to a rights-
centered framework depends not only or even primarily on the emergence of
new ideas. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, among supporters of reproductive
equity, worries about the language of rights crossed lines of race, class, and role
within the movement. In contemporary discussion of reproductive justice,
advocates point out the problems with a rights-centered approach, such as the
needs and services not covered by such a concept and the disconnect between
women's view of reproductive health services and the movement's framing of
the issues. Together with women of color, providers and some political activists
made similar objections to the idea of rights in the late 1980s and early 1990s
but found a largely unreceptive audience. The political environment of the
period-one defined by a resurgent Republican Party, an energized Religious
Right, and a competitive market for health care delivery-made movement
leaders reluctant to play down constitutional discourse. As Part IV suggests, the
fortunes of arguments for reproductive justice may similarly rise and fall
depending not just on the intellectual case for a broad agenda but also on the
political climate activists confront.
IV. PUTTING RIGHTS IN CONTEXT
Unearthing the history of debates between advocates of reproductive
liberty about the costs of rights discourse contributes ignificantly to a broader
scholarly discussion of whether and how constitutional discourse advances
social change. Starting in the 1960s, legal commentators and historians
questioned the emphasis movements put on judicial victories, seeing these
often hollow victories as a symptom of both the nation's preoccupation with
legalism and the limited value of constitutional rights.275 While movements
continued to rely on rights claims in the 1970s and 1980s, a fierce debate raged
in the academy.276 Although most scholars agreed that a rights-centered
strategy counted among the political resources a movement could deploy,
274. See supra note 276 and accompanying text.
275. For a sample of early works, see, for example, MURRAY EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF
POLITICS (1964); JUDITH N. SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS, AND POLITICAL TRIALS (1964);
Lawrence M. Friedman, Legal Culture and Social Development, 4 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 29 (1969); and
Karen M. Tani, Welfare and Rights Before the Movement: Rights as a Language of the State, 122 YALE
L.J. 314, 369 n.239 (2012).
276. For analysis of these conflicts, see, for example, Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay
for Robert Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 1860, 1862 (1987); Tani, supra note 275, at 370 n.241; and Robin L.
West, Tragic Rights: The Rights Critique in the Age of Obama, 53 WM. & MARY L. REv. 713, 714-15,
719-21 (2011).
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commentators found themselves deeply divided about whether-and when-
constitutional discourse or litigation hamstrung change agents.27 7
More recently, legal historians, constitutional scholars, and social-
movement scholars have teased out when litigation or rights-claiming furthers
the work of activists seeking social change. Cautioning against broad
generalization, commentators have revealed the value of constitutional
discourse to be context-dependent and contingent.2 78 Some highlight the
distinction between litigation and rights-claiming, playing up the downsides of
seeking change in the courts. Gerald Rosenberg contends that litigation rarely
delivers the promised results while consuming precious resources.2 79 Michael
Klarman goes a step further, insisting that judicial decisions that outpace social
change trigger damaging backlashes, setting back the very causes a court
embraces. 280
Others see litigation as a double-edged sword. On the one hand, litigation
can mobilize new recruits, legitimate a movement's claims, and embolden
those seeking to organize.281 Victories in court can lay the foundation for
-282
collective action. By extension, in legitimating movement demands,
favorable judicial decisions can serve as an important tool for activists seeking
to secure the support of political and social elites-groups that represent crucial
sources of fundraising and recruits, particularly in periods when the level of
- 283inter-movement conflict is less intense.
Moreover, courts provide a valuable political opportunity for nascent
movements still unable to influence electoral politics or legislation.284 Elected
officials can largely control whether movements can air their grievances in the
277. See supra note 276 and accompanying text.
278. See, e.g., Douglas Neiaime, Constitutional Change, Courts, and Social Movements, 11l
MICH. L. REV. 877, 890-95, 891 (2013) (reviewing JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION:
POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST WORLD (2011)) (summarizing and endorsing scholarship that
"integrate[s] courts into broader political conflicts and assess[es] the impact of courts in a contextual and
contingent way").
279. See ROSENBERG, supra note 4, at 173-78, 201, 241; Gerald N. Rosenberg, Courting Disaster:
Looking for Change in All the Wrong Places, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 795, 810-12 (2005).
280. See KLARMAN, supra note 4, at x; MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS:
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 465 (2004); ROSENBERG, supra note
4, at 415-19.
281. See, e.g., MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE POLITICS
OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION 144-45 (1994); Douglas NeJaime, Winning Through Losing, 96 IOWA L. REV.
941, 944 (2011) ("Litigation wins may also generate elite support, pressure adversaries, and increase a
social movement's bargaining power." (footnote omitted)).
282. See, e.g., Catherine R. Albiston, Bargaining in the Shadow of Social Institutions: Competing
Discourses and Social Change in Workplace Mobilization of Civil Rights, 39 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 11,
27-28 (2005).
283. See, e.g., J. Craig Jenkins, Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements,
9 ANN. REV. Soc. 527, 533 (1983); David S. Meyer, Protest and Political Opportunities, 30 ANN. REV.
Soc. 125, 129-30, 137 (2004); NeJaime, supra note 278, at 897.
284. See, e.g., Scott L. Cummings, The Pursuit of Legal Rights--and Beyond, 59 UCLA L. REV.
506, 524 (2012) ("Members of disadvantaged groups have historically used American-style public
interest law, particularly court-based litigation, to leverage policy gains that could not be effectively
achieved through majoritarian politics.").
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political arena.285 By contrast, even in the case of recently formed movements,
activists can go to court to articulate a problem with the larger society and seek
some legal resolution.28 6 In a federalist system, where federal, state, and local
politics influence the membership, ideological orientation, and popular attitudes
defining different courts, movements can leverage differences between levels
of government and states.287
On the other hand, as Catherine Albiston argues, "litigation can change
socialmovements from within in deeply constitutive ways even as they wield it
to victory."288 Litigation can in this way transform internal movement conflicts,
empowering factions that embrace a particular legal vision and silencing those
who dissent.289 In particular, commentators canvass how litigation moderates
movement demands. William Eskridge asserts that reliance on constitutional
norms leads activists to discount more radical goals.290Similarly, Reva Siegel
demonstrates how activists moderate their claims as a result of movement-
countermovement conflict and commitments to winning popular support.291
Historians echo this concern. Tomiko Brown-Nagin concludes that "elite-
dominated interest group litigation and progressive social movements aimed at
accomplishing fundamental change are distinct and largely incompatible
,,292phenomena. In studying the civil rights movement, Risa Goluboff illustrates
how court-centered tactics led movement members to favor strategies and
arguments that fit within an existing-and successful-litigation strategy over
previously crucial claims for socioeconomic justice.29 3 William Forbath shows
how the labor movement's interaction with the courts reshaped activists'
demands and consciousness in conservative ways.2 94
Without disregarding the importance of context, legal scholars and
historians hold out more hope for rights-claiming that remains largely
disconnected from litigation. Historians of the welfare-rights movement, civil
285. See, e.g., Douglas NeJaime, The Legal Mobilization Dilemma, 61 EMORY L.J. 663, 688
(2012); Emily Zackin, Popular Constitutionalism's Hard When You're Not Very Popular: Why the
ACLU Turnedto Courts, 42 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 367, 384, 387-88 (2008).
286. See supra note 284 and accompanying text.
287. See David S. Meyer & Suzanne Staggenborg, Opposing Movement Strategies in U.S. Abortion
Politics, in 28 RESEARCH IN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, CONFLICTS AND CHANGE 207, 213 (Patrick G. Coy
ed., 2008); NeJaime, supra note 278, at 901.
288. Albiston, supra note 5, at 77.
289. See, e.g., NeJaime, supra note 278, at 895; see also Myra Marx Ferree, Resonance and
Radicalism: Feminist Framing in the Abortion Debates of the United States and Germany, 109 AM. J.
Soc. 304, 306 (2003) ("When movements seek the advantages resonance offers they also accept
political costs, particularly in marginalizing alternative frames, the speakers who offer them, and the
constituencies whose concerns they express.").
290. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based Social Movements and Public Law,
150 U. PA. L. REV. 419, 487 (2001).
291. See Siegel, supra note 2, at 1364.
292. Brown-Nagin, supra note 5, at 1445.
293. See Goluboff, supra note 5, at 2015-17.
294. See WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT
128 (1991).
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rights movement, and women's liberation movement showcase how
constitutional discourse can crystallize activists' awareness of the need for
change and empower movement members to mobilize and voice their views.295
Some feminist and critical race theorists contend that under certain
circumstances, rights-claiming can serve as an important tool for outsiders
seeking inclusion in the larger society.296 For these scholars, constitutional
discourse can help to strengthen activists' political consciousness and can serve
as a vehicle for transformative ideas.
For the most part, leading studies explore the value of rights-claiming to
movements from the outside in, focusing on an objective analysis of the costs
and benefits to change agents of using constitutional discourse. By contrast,
this Article moves from the inside out, primarily examining how activists
understood, resisted, and navigated the limits of rights rhetoric. Approaching
the issue in this way adds a new dimension to studies of the stakes and
advantages of rights talk.
First, the history of reproductive politics in the 1980s and 1990s expands
our understanding of the flexibility and adaptability of constitutional discourse.
At first glance, movement members seemed bound by a shared constitutional
language. A deeper analysis makes plain that activists used rights rhetoric to
express a rich variety of ideas about what reproductive justice meant, how
social change took place, and who had the authority to enforce the Constitution.
Significantly, beyond acting as a vehicle for transformative ideas, rights-
claiming did not crowd out other ideas of what the movement should say.
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, different factions recognized the limits of
constitutional rhetoric, and some movement members actively resisted those
limitations. The success or failure of challenges to a rights-based strategy
depended in part on the larger political climate-particularly, the availability of
allies in Congress and state legislatures and the competition for resources and
recruits. Movement dissenters continued to press their demands even when
mainstream leaders expressed little interest in a change of direction.
In this way, the materials presented here highlight the potential value of
rights-claiming. Constitutional discourse accommodated a variety of ideas of
about reproductive health and popular engagement with legal issues. Rights
295. See generally, e.g., FELICIA KORNBLUH, THE BATTLE FOR WELFARE RIGHTS: POLITICS AND
POVERTYIN MODERN AMERICA (2007) (welfare-rights movement); NANCY MACLEAN, FREEDOMIS NOT
ENOUGH THE OPENING OF THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE (2006) (civil rights movement); Deborah Dinner,
The Universal Childcare Debate: Rights Mobilization, Social Policy, and the Dynamics of Feminist
Activism, 1966-1974, 28 LAW & HIST. REV. 577 (2010) (women's liberation movement).
296. See, e.g., PATRICIA J. WILLIAMs, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 145-65 (1991); Monica
J. Evans, Stealing Away: Black Women, Outlaw Culture, and the Rhetoric of Rights, in CRITICAL RACE
THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE 500, 508-10 (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 2d ed. 2000). Some
feminist scholars join critical race theorists in assessing the utility as well as the limitations of rights
discourse. See, e.g., Elizabeth Schneider, The Dialectics of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the
Women's Movement, MAT THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW: FEMTNISM AND LEGAL THEORY 301, 301-19
(Martha Albertson Fineman & Nancy Sweet Thomadsen eds., 1991).
[Vol. 28:103146
Reproducing Rights
talk did not have the de-radicalizing effect so many scholars identify. Some
factions persisted in questioning the value of constitutional discourse while
others used it to make bolder demands for change or to endorse grassroots
protest tactics.
Just the same, the history of reproductive politics in the 1980s and 1990s
suggests that some of the downsides scholars tie to litigation may more often
involve rights-claiming than we often believe. Even when they had given up on
the courts, leading supporters of reproductive liberty prioritized legal access to
abortion, whether secured by Congress, state legislatures, or grassroots protest.
Consistently, mainstream organizations devalued or rejected claims believed to
threaten legal access, even if a particular argument would more likely resonate
with the movement's base or better reflect activists' fundamental principles.
Privileging legal rights encouraged activists to prioritize strategies that would
pay dividends in the short term, even if those tactics strengthened the hand of
the antiabortion movement in the longer term. For example, to forestall a threat
to legal access, leading activists worked to play down arguments that might
otherwise have helped to de-stigmatize abortion or capture the emotional
experiences of women who chose the procedure.
In this way, the story of reproductive politics in the 1980s and 1990s
suggests that rights-claiming can moderate movement demands even when
activists no longer focus on litigation. Commentators often argue that
constitutionalizing an issue makes movement members overcautious, unwilling
to put at risk a precious and hard-won right.297 Supporters of reproductive
liberty exhibited the same aversion to risk when many expected the courts to
abandon the cause and planned for the de-constitutionalization of the issue.
Nonetheless, movement leaders sometimes sacrificed strategies and arguments
thought to conflict with activists' longstanding commitment to legal access.
This history suggests that the moderating effect of the law on those seeking
social change is even more unpredictable and context dependent than scholars
have recognized.
Studying the benefits of rights-claiming from the inside out can provide
new insight about how change agents themselves understand the value of
constitutional discourse. An inside-out analysis reminds us of the importance of
intra-movement conflict about what rights mean and whether activists should
rely on them. But the value of understanding debates about constitutional
discourse runs both ways. While the history of movement debates about
constitutional discourse offer scholars new perspectives on when, how, and
why activists turn to rights talk, scholars writing in a variety of disciplines have
illuminated the tradeoffs that have defined rights-claiming in the past. Through
dialogue of this kind, both scholars and movement leaders might forge a more
297. See, e.g., West, supra note 273, at 1400-01.
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nuanced and comprehensive view of when rights discourse helps those seeking
to transform the larger society.
CONCLUSION
The story of battles about rights-claiming within the movement for
reproductive liberty is ultimately paradoxical. Rights talk created a common
language for movement members with dramatically different ideas about
strategy and even fundamental values. Constitutional discourse proved
surprisingly and consistently malleable, as activists projected a rich array of
shifting meanings onto a single fundamental right. At the same time, by
focusing on legal access, movement leaders pushed below the surface
arguments and tactics that hreatened the status quo activists battled to preserve.
Perhaps the most provocative question posed by this history involves the
efficacy of the rights discourse feminists deployed. The materials here remind
us that the value of rights-claiming depends on more than the success or failure
of a movement's legislative aims. To be sure, feminists had mixed results when
using constitutional discourse to seek political change, losing some legislative
fights and winning others, influencing some national elections while others
slipped out of reach. But the costs and benefits of a reliance on rights rhetoric
cannot be measured by looking at discrete legal changes. Instead, as the history
presented here makes clear, constitutional discourse can both serve as a vehicle
for a dizzying array of bold claims and obscure alternative visions for a
movement's future.
Finally, recovering internal debates about the reasons for rights-claiming
can help us better understand not only the contradictions of rights
argumentation but also the vision of reproductive justice movement members
unsuccessfully championed as an alternative to one centered on the
Constitution. Such an approach posed a fundamental challenge to existing ideas
about the morality of abortion and the competence and ethics of women. As
commentators seek a path away from rights talk to a more comprehensive idea
of reproductive justice, we would do well to remember those in the past who
fought for the same thing.
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